Census Bureau Announces Tips for Correcting AES Fatal Errors

December 6th, 2017 by Danielle McClellan

2013/03/04

By: John Black

If you submit your Electronic Export Information (EEI) through the Automated Export System (AES) and you get a “fatal error,” that means your submission is dead and you cannot proceed with the export until you correct the fatal error. The Census Bureau announced on its website fixes to two common fatal errors:

Fatal Error Response Code 004

  • Narrative: Filer/Transmitter Not Authorized To Send
  • Reason: The Filer/Transmitter combination was not recognized by AES.
  • Resolution: The combination of Filer ID, Transmitter ID, and Communication Password reported defines a pre-established AES filer/transmitter. The Filer/Transmitter combination must be authorized to file in AES. Verify the Filer ID and Transmitter ID reported, correct the shipment and resubmit.

Fatal Error Response Code 666

  • Narrative: ECCN Must Be From Approved List
  • Reason: The Export Control Classification Number (ECCN) reported is not on the list of codes allowed for the License Code/License Exemption reported.
  • Resolution: See Appendix F – License and License Exemption Type Codes and Reporting Guidelines for a list of approved ECCN codes for the License Code/License Exemption reported. Verify the ECCN and License Code/License Exemption correct the shipment and resubmit.

Congress Passes Legislation Subjecting U.S. Foreign Affiliates to U.S. Sanctions against Iran

December 6th, 2017 by admin

2012/09/04

By: Stanley J. Marcuss, Esq. sjmarcuss@bryancave.com, 202-508-6074; Bryan Cave LLP;  George F. Murphy, Esq. george.murphy@bryancave.com, 202-508-8124, Bryan Cave LLP. Reprinted by permission.

Congress has passed, as predicted, the legislation imposing new sanctions against Iran.  The legislation passed the House by an overwhelming 421-6 vote and passed the Senate by voice vote.  The President is expected to sign the legislation.

As we reported in our July 31, 2012 memorandum entitled “Congress Set to Pass Legislation Increasing U.S. Sanctions Against Iran,” the principal feature is a provision subjecting foreign affiliates owned or controlled by a U.S. company to the same prohibitions as their U.S. parent.  The legislation requires that the President make the prohibitions effective against foreign affiliates within 60 days of its enactment.

The legislation would also make a U.S. parent company subject to civil penalties for its foreign affiliate’s transactions with Iran that violate, attempt to violate, conspire to violate or cause a violation of regulations or orders issued pursuant to the new legislation.  The legislation would allow a U.S. company to avoid penalties if it divests or terminates its business with the foreign affiliate within 180 days of enactment.

The legislation includes an array of other sanctions against Iran involving Iran’s energy sector and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as well as sanctions addressing human rights abuses in Iran and Syria.  Subjecting foreign affiliates to the same prohibitions as their U.S. parent, however, will make U.S. foreign affiliate business with Iran impermissible after such business had been permissible under U.S. law for decades.

Whirlpool Europe Srl (Italy)/Whirlpool Corporation to Pay Civil Settlements to Settle Alleged Antiboycott Violations

November 15th, 2017 by Danielle McClellan

2017/11/15

By: Ashleigh Foor (Source: Commerce/BIS)

On September 25, 2017, Whirlpool Europe Srl (Italy) was charged with three violations of 15 CFR 760.2(a), refusal to do business, ten violations of 15 CFR 760.2(d), furnishing information about business relationships with boycotted countries or blacklisted persons, and eight violations of 15 CFR 760.5, failing to report the receipt of a request to engage in a restrictive trade practice or foreign boycott against a country friendly to the United States (Case No: 14-02(A)). A civil settlement of $72,450, if paid as agreed, will keep Whirlpool from being debarred or suspended from export transactions.

Related case number 14-02(B) involves Whirlpool Corporation. The company received a civil settlement of $9,000 for three violations of 15 CFR 760.2(d), furnishing information about business relationships with boycotted countries or blacklisted persons. No debarment or suspension will be placed if penalty is paid as agreed.

Impact of President Trump’s Iran Policy Announcement: No Changes for Now, but the Future of the JCPOA Remains Uncertain

November 15th, 2017 by Danielle McClellan

2017/11/15

By: Glen Kelley, Doug Jacobson, Michael Burton & David Brummond Jacobson Burton Kelley PLLC

www.jbktradelaw.com

On October 13, 2017 President Trump announced the long-awaited results of his Administration’s Iran policy review. The key aspect of the announcement was that President Trump will not renew certification of Iranian compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (“JCPOA”) as required by the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015 (“INARA”), a law passed by the US Congress to provide oversight of the JCPOA. President Trump stated that his decision was made because Iran “has committed multiple violations of the JCPOA” and “has not lived up to the spirit of the agreement.”

President Trump also stated that he will “terminate” US participation in the JCPOA unless the parties to the JCPOA agree to make various changes to the JCPOA and that he will request the US Congress to modify INARA to reflect the Administration’s concerns. Following President Trump’s announcement, OFAC designated the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (“IRGC”) as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) as required by Congress in a law passed in August 2017. While there has been much discussion on the designation of the IRGC as a SDGT, in practice the designation was purely symbolic as the IRGC has been listed on OFAC’s Specially Designated National List since 2007 under various Executive Orders.

Though significant, these announcements do not trigger any changes in the status of the JCPOA or to existing US sanctions.

Following the President’s announcement, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson indicated that staying in the JCPOA “was in the best interests of the US.” In addition, Treasury Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Sigal Mandelker said yesterday that it “is important not to confuse the internal US legal process of certification under INARA with our continued implementation of the JCPOA.”

President Trump’s decision not to certify Iran’s compliance with the JCPOA under Inara now shifts the burden to the US Congress, which could in the coming months reimpose some or all of the secondary sanctions on Iran that were waived on January 16, 2016 when the JCPOA was implemented. In addition, President Trump could in the future refuse to waive the secondary sanctions on Iran that remain suspended and could direct OFAC to terminate OFAC General License H.

While the US position on Iran should become clearer in the coming months, President Trump’s continued criticism of the JCPOA increases the uncertainty regarding (1) the future of US sanctions relief that was a key part of the nuclear agreement with Iran, and (2) whether non-US companies will continue to be able to conduct business with Iran without fear or being subject to US sanctions.

Increased Risk of US Withdrawal from JCPOA and “Snap-Back” of US Sanctions on Iran

It is important to recall that the US has suspended only a small portion of its Iran sanctions for US companies (relating to commercial aircraft), and “US persons” remain prohibited from nearly all transactions involving Iran or its government.

Nearly all of the suspended US sanctions were “secondary” sanctions primarily directed at non-US companies and individuals. The recent events increase the risk of reimposition or “snap-back” of US sanctions, which could be done in one of the following ways:

1. Reimposition of Sanctions Within Next 60 Days – Once the President fails to certify Iran’s compliance with the JCPOA, Congress can pass “qualifying legislation” under INARA in 60 days choosing to reimpose all or some of the Iranian sanctions that have been suspended. However, there does not appear to be significant interest by Congress to proceed in this direction at this time and it is not likely that the necessary votes can be obtained to proceed under this route.

2. Contingent Future Sanctions – Another scenario that is being contemplated by congressional leadership (the Corker-Cotton proposal) is to amend INARA to automatically reimpose US sanctions on Iran’s nuclear program in the future if Iran crosses key thresholds. Among the thresholds being considered is if weapons-grade nuclear material accumulates to the point where there is less than a one-year “breakout” period for obtaining a nuclear weapon.

3. Failure to Waive Suspended Sanctions – Under the JCPOA the President must waive the various sanctions that were suspended. Depending on the underlying law, these waivers must be renewed every 120 days to every six months. It is possible that the Trump Administration could simply choose not to renew one or more of the waivers, which would automatically reimpose the US sanctions. The next waiver deadline is in mid-January 2018. Such action would not require congressional approval and would effectively snap-back sanctions on Iran.

4. Unilateral Withdrawal from JCPOA – The JCPOA does not specifically authorize any party to the agreement to “withdraw.” However, the US could choose to cease implementing its commitments under the agreement, which would effectively lead to US abrogation of the JCPOA.

Next Steps and Practical Impact

Because the JCPOA is a multilateral arrangement, a decision by the US to withdraw from the agreement or to reimpose sanctions would have significant ramifications. Iran has threatened to stop complying with its commitments to curtail its nuclear program if the US reimposes sanctions. The costs of Iran’s reinitiating its nuclear program, however, could undercut the sanctions relief it has received from trading partners other than the US. The EU has made clear that if the suspended US sanctions are reimposed, the EU intends to continue to abide by the terms of the JCPOA so long as Iran does. If US sanctions are reimposed, the EU member states would likely support their companies in their Iranian activity and would strongly oppose any US government move to penalize them under reimposed sanctions. There is also the possibility that the EU would expand its sanctions blocking legislation (sometimes referred to in the EU as antiboycott laws) to cover US secondary sanctions on Iran. If Iran stopped complying with the JCPOA, the EU member states would likely withdraw their support for their companies’ activities in Iran, and might even move to the dispute resolution procedures of the JCPOA or a UN Security Council review, which could lead to the reimposition of EU sanctions.

While we are currently in uncharted waters and are dealing with an unpredictable US Administration, the following is a summary of the possible changes to impact on the JCPOA and US sanctions:

1. Incremental non-nuclear additional sanctions are likely, but the reimposition of the suspended US secondary sanctions or other major changes in the near future seem unlikely at this time. It is important to recall that there have been no immediate changes to US sanctions on Iran.

2. The Trump Administration could terminate US participation in the JCPOA and reimpose sanctions in the future, if insufficient progress is made with the parties to the JCPOA to address certain concerns relating to Iran. There are early indications that EU leaders might try to find a way to provide these additional assurances from Iran regarding their activities of concern.

3. The US could reimpose the suspended secondary (extraterritorial) sanctions. While appearing dramatic, this may not have much practical impact on many non-US companies. Moreover, if discreet secondary (extraterritorial) sanctions are “snapped-back”, it seems likely the EU and its member states would defend EU-based companies from the adverse economic consequences of a reimposition of sanctions.

4. If US sanctions are reimposed, there is reason to believe that Iran, after protesting, would continue to abide by its JCPOA commitments, particularly if it remains clear that the EU and other countries involved in the JCPOA intend to continue to abide by its terms and authorize business with Iran. Of course it is possible that Iran would follow through on its threat to pull out, and this likely would have a more dramatic practical impact.

Whatever the outcome, the OFAC policy that authorizes the export of US-origin humanitarian products to Iran, including medicine, medical devices, and agricultural products, will remain unchanged, just as it was during the height of US sanctions. However, payments for these transactions remains difficult due to the reluctance of many non-US banks to handle Iran-related payments.

Tips on How to Resolve AES Fatal Errors

November 15th, 2017 by Danielle McClellan

2017/11/15

(Source: census@subscriptions.census.gov, 19 Oct 2017.)

When a shipment is filed to the AES, a system response message is generated and indicates whether the shipment has been accepted or rejected. If the shipment is accepted, the AES filer receives an Internal Transaction Number (ITN) as confirmation. However, if the shipment is rejected, a Fatal Error notification is received.

To help you resolve AES Fatal Errors, here are some tips on how to correct the most frequent errors that were generated in AES for this month.

Fatal Error Response Code: 128

  • Narrative: Port of Export Unknown
  • Reason: The Port of Export Code reported is not valid in AES.
  • Resolution: The Port of Export Code must be valid in AES. Valid Port of Export Codes reportable in AES are contained in Appendix D – Export Port Codes. Verify the Port of Export Code, correct the shipment and resubmit.

Fatal Error Response Code: 147

  • Narrative: Routed Export Indicator Missing
  • Reason: The Routed Export Indicator is missing.
  • Resolution: A routed export transaction is a transaction in which the Foreign Principal Party in Interest (FPPI) authorizes a U.S. agent to facilitate the export of items from the United States and to prepare and file Electronic Export Information (EEI). You must report the Routed Export Indicator as Yes or No. Verify whether or not this is a routed export transaction, correct the shipment and resubmit.

For a complete list of Fatal Error Response Codes, their reasons, and resolutions, see Appendix A – Commodity Filing Response Messages.

It is important that AES filers correct Fatal Errors as soon as they are received in order to comply with the Foreign Trade Regulations. These errors must be corrected prior to export for shipments filed predeparture and as soon as possible for shipments filed postdeparture but not later than five calendar days after departure.

For further information or questions, contact the U.S. Census Bureau’s Data Collection Branch

Miltech, Inc. of Northampton, MA Receives 18 Charges of Alleged Export Violations

November 15th, 2017 by Danielle McClellan

2017/11/15

By: Ashleigh Foor

On September 25, 2017, Miltech, Inc. of Northampton, MA was charged a civil penalty of $230,000 due to engaging in conduct prohibited by the EAR when it exported items subject to the EAR from the United States to China and Russia without the required BIS Licenses. On eighteen separate occasions between, on, or around October 14, 2011 and July 14, 2014, Miltech exported active multiplier chains, items classified under Export Control Classification Number (“ECCN”) 3A001.b.4 and valued in total at approximately $364,947, without seeking or obtaining the licenses required for these exports pursuant to section 742.4 of the EAR. These items are controlled on national security and anti-terrorism grounds.

Miltech received 18 charges of 15 C.F.R. § 764.2(a) for engaging in prohibited conduct. $180,000 of the $230,000 penalty must be paid within 30 days, and the remaining $50,000 will be suspended and waived after two years if Miltech fulfills the terms of its settlement agreement and this order.  The company will not be debarred if penalty is paid as agreed and Miltech complies with other terms of this settlement.

Automated Commercial Environment Export Reports… What’s New?

October 16th, 2017 by Danielle McClellan

2017/10/16

(Source: Global Reach Blog)

With more than 128,000 Automated Commercial Environment (ACE) export reports run since deployment mid-2015 and more than 6,762 reports run during the month of June 2017 alone, it’s evident that the trade community is using the export reports feature in ACE, and its popularity is ever increasing.

We received a lot of positive feedback and information on ACE Export Reports by EIN that helped us improve the utility of the feature, as well as enhance our training resources library.

Customer feedback continues to shape the way we do business. The following examples help illustrate the updates prompted and informed by such customer feedback:

  • The available data elements have been updated to include the Country of Ultimate Destination.
  • U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) created 11 short topic-based export reports training videos available in the ACE Portal and on the CBP website.
  • A webinar and Q&A on ACE Export Reports was conducted in mid-December 2016 and subsequently an updated version of that webinar that was conducted in July 2017 and may be viewed online now for on-demand viewing and training needs.
  • The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking effective in July 2017 added additional data elements (the Internal Transaction Number, filer name and date of export) to the AES 203 (Agent-Filed Routed) Report to make this report useful. This data is now also searchable by filing date and export date.

These are just a few of the ways that you’ve helped us more effectively help you. We realize that users are exploring the export reports feature in ACE. We want to empower our users to utilize all of the available functionality.

And, here are just a few reminders:

  • The three available reports include: AES 201 (Filer), AES 202 U.S. Principal Party in Interest (USPPI) and AES 203 (Agent-Filed Routed).
  • The AES 201 and AES 202 will initially return a smaller universe of data elements (25). Learn how to add or remove data elements by watching the “Modifying Report Queries” video available on the CBP Export Reports resource page and in the Training Resources area in the ACE Portal.
  • The AES 203 report will only return the handful of data elements that are authorized by the Foreign Trade Regulations. ACE Importer accounts automatically have access to export reports for Employer Identification Numbers (EINs) already vetted by CBP on the import side. ACE Exporter accounts must be vetted by the U.S. Census Bureau.

Exporters are able to run comprehensive reports based on their EIN and review the Electronic Export Information that has been filed internally and externally. Authorized agents are able to run reports across the universe of filings they have transmitted, as well as run individual reports at the client level. The benefits of having this type of on-demand access is revolutionary to the export compliance landscape and gives the trade community a powerful auditing capability. We highly recommend that you obtain authorization to access reports if you have not done so already, and if you have access, to explore the functionality that is available to you.

Until the next update, happy reporting!

P.S. There is even a “Late Filing Indicator” data element that can be added to customized reports … how beneficial is that to your compliance pursuit?

Failing to Keep Current with Classifications Leads to Civil Penalty for NJ-based Company

October 16th, 2017 by Danielle McClellan

2017/10/16

By: Ashleigh Foor

During the second week of September, Bright Lights USA, a Barrington, NJ-based company, received a $400,000 civil penalty from the State Department’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) for exporting unauthorized defense components and technical data, which violates the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR).

Bright Lights notified DDTC of two ITAR violations in voluntary self-disclosures filed with the agency in April 2013 and June 2016.

Bright Lights failed to stay current with the former Obama administration’s Export Control Reform (ECR) regarding  the transition of ITAR-related commodities/technology from the State Department’s US Munitions List to the Commerce Control List. The wrong commodity jurisdiction was selected and resulted in export violations for both the physical export of the items and the illegal transfer of technology made by the company.

Want to make sure your company is staying compliant? We have an upcoming webinar on classifications:

EAR Hardware and Materials Classifications: Learning By Doing

Practice Makes Perfect—A Two-Part Webinar that Combines Hands-On Exercises, Discussions, and Instruction. October 25, 2017 & November 8, 2017

US Citizen CEO Sentenced to 57 Months in Prison for Conspiring to Export Specialty Metals to Iran

October 16th, 2017 by Danielle McClellan

2017/10/16

By: Ashleigh Foor

On Friday, September 8, 2017, Erdal Kuyumcu, a US citizen and the chief executive officer of Global Metallurgy, LLC, based in Woodside, New York, was sentenced to 57 months in prison for conspiring to export specialty metals to Iran. The sentencing took place at the federal courthouse in Brooklyn, New York and proceedings held before Chief United States District Judge Dora L. Irizarry. In June 14, 2016, Kuyumcu plead guilty to conspiracy to violate the International Emergency Economic Powers Act by exporting specialty metals from the United States to Iran.

According to court documents, Kuyumcu conspired to export from the United States to Iran a metallic powder primarily composed of cobalt and nickel, without having obtained the required license from the US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). It was determined after a two-day presentencing evidentiary hearing that the metallic powder has potential military and nuclear uses. In order to prevent nuclear proliferation and terrorism, the US Department of Commerce requires a license to export and exporting without the required license is illegal.

In addition, Kuyumcu and others planned to obtain more than 1,000 pounds of the metallic powder from a US-based supplier, and hid the true destination of the goods by having it shipped first to Turkey and then to Iran. Coded language was used to keep this all secret, for instance, referring to Iran as the “neighbor.”  Once a shipment was sent from Turkey to Iran, a steel company in Iran would send a letter-sized package to Kuyumcu’s Turkey-based co-conspirator.

The Iranian steel company had the same address as an OFAC-designated Iranian entity under the Weapons of Mass Destruction proliferators’ sanctions program that was associated with Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs.

Expanded Russia, Iran, and North Korea Sanctions: Top 10 Takeaways

October 16th, 2017 by Danielle McClellan

2017/10/16

(Source: Latham & Watkins LLP)

Authors: Les P. Carnegie, Esq., les.carnegie@lw.com, 202-637-1096; and William M. McGlone, Esq., william.mcglone@lw.com, 202-637-2202

President Trump signs the “Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act,” which – among other measures – requires Congressional review to ease Russia-related sanctions.

On Wednesday, August 2, 2017, President Trump signed into law the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (the Act). The Act significantly expands and codifies US sanctions targeting Russia, and it adds several measures to the already comprehensive US sanctions on Iran and North Korea. The Act passed both houses of Congress last week, with a vote of 419-3 in the House of Representatives and 98-2 in the Senate.

The Act is particularly significant because it codifies many of the Russia-related sanctions measures introduced by President Obama through executive orders, effectively requiring President Trump to secure Congressional approval before easing the targeted US sanctions relating to Russia. Russian President Vladimir Putin has announced his intention to impose retaliatory sanctions in response to the Act, and the Russian Foreign Ministry reportedly ordered a more than 60% cut in US diplomatic staff and suspended use of two US facilities in Russia.

Here are the top 10 takeaways from the Act:

RUSSIA-RELATED SANCTIONS

(1) Codifying and Expanding Existing Sanctions.

The Act codifies the following Executive Orders issued by President Obama: Executive Orders 1366013661136621368513694, and 13757. Among other measures, these Executive Orders imposed a virtual embargo on the Crimea region of Ukraine; imposed sanctions against perpetrators of malicious cyber activity and designated Russian and Ukrainian individuals, including government officials and oligarchs; and provided the underlying authority for Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) Directive 1Directive 2Directive 3, and Directive 4.

The first three OFAC Directives prohibit US persons from extending medium- to long-term credit, or otherwise dealing in “new” debt (and in some cases “new” equity), of designated Russian financial institutions, energy firms, and companies in the defense sector. Directive 4 prohibits US persons from providing goods, software, technology, and services in support of certain non-conventional oil projects in Russia.

The Act expands certain of these Executive Orders and Directives:

* The Act gives the US Treasury Secretary the power to impose sanctions pursuant to Executive Order 13662, including the financing-type sanctions found in the OFAC Directives, against state-owned parties in Russia in the railways, metals, and mining sectors of the Russian economy. Prior to the Act, the targeted sectors were limited to the financial, energy, and defense sectors.

* No later than 60 days after enactment of the Act (or approximately the beginning of October), the US Treasury Secretary must modify Directive 1 to reduce the “new” debt prohibition to 14 days, down from the current 30 days, and Directive 2 from the current 90 days to 60 days. These 14-day and 60-day changes will be effective 60 days after the Directives are modified, which provides some time for US parties to adjust to this change. Notably, current OFAC interpretation (see OFAC FAQ # 419) is that extending payment terms of more than 30 days to a Directive 1 target violates the “new debt” prohibition, meaning that payment terms to Directive 1 parties will need to be reduced to no more than two weeks. The same is the case with respect to Directive 2 targets, for which the payment term requirement will be reduced to 60 days.

– The Act also requires the US Treasury Secretary to, within 180 days of enactment, submit to Congress a report “describing in detail the potential effects of expanding sanctions under Directive 1 … to include sovereign debt and the full range of derivative products.”

* No later than 90 days after the Act’s enactment (or approximately the beginning of November), the US Treasury Secretary must modify Directive 4, to prohibit US persons not only from providing goods, services (other than financial services), and technology to projects in Russia relating to the exploration or production for oil for deepwater, Arctic offshore, or shale projects, but to such projects anywhere in the world. Notably, the Directive’s expansion appears to reach non-conventional exploration and production beyond Russia, applies only to “new” deepwater, Arctic offshore, or shale projects, and only those projects where the Directive 4 target “has a controlling interest or a substantial non-controlling ownership interest in such a project defined as not less than a 33 percent interest.”

– This “new” and “substantial non-controlling ownership interest” language was added by the House to the Senate version, in an attempt to ease concerns raised by US energy firms and European allies regarding the breadth of the provision. This new provision will be effective 90 days after the US Treasury Secretary modifies Directive 4.

(2) Congressional Oversight of the President’s Russia-Related Actions.

Notably, the Act gives the US Congress the opportunity during a 30-day review period to disapprove of any effort by the President to reduce, waive, or eliminate US sanctions relating to Russia. Section 216 of the Act gives Congress the power to review (i) any action to terminate the application of the sanctions in the Act, the codified Executive Orders mentioned above, and certain other statutes; (ii) any action to waive the application of sanctions targeted at certain persons, such as parties added to the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons list (SDN List) or the List of Sectoral Sanctions Identifications parties (SSI List), or (iii) any “licensing action that significantly alters United States’ foreign policy with regard to the Russian Federation.”

(3) Energy Pipeline Secondary Sanctions.

The Act gives the President the power to impose, but does not require, secondary sanctions on foreign persons that knowingly (i) make an investment of US$1 million or more (or US$5 million or more over a 12-month period) that directly and significantly contributes to enhancing Russia’s ability to construct energy export pipelines or (ii) sell, lease, or provide to the Russian Federation, goods, services, technology, information, or support (valued at US$1 million or more, or during a 12-month period with an aggregate value of US$5 million or more) that could directly and significantly facilitate the maintenance or expansion of the construction, modernization, or repair of energy pipelines.

* The Act appears to require the President to impose any such sanctions “in coordination with allies of the United States.” This language was added to the House version of the Act in response to concerns raised by European allies, in light of such projects as the proposed Nord Stream 2 natural gas pipeline from Russia to Germany.

(4) Cybersecurity Sanctions.

On or after 60 days of enactment, the Act requires the President, subject to a national security interest waiver, to impose asset-blocking as well as travel sanctions, including certain secondary sanctions, on any person who knowingly engages in significant activities that undermine the cybersecurity of any person or government, including a democratic institution, on behalf of the Russian government. Any national security interest waiver submitted by the President to avoid the imposition of sanctions must be accompanied by a certification that the Russian government has “made significant efforts to reduce the number and intensity of cyber intrusions conducted by that Government.” The Act includes a definition of what constitutes “significant activities undermining cybersecurity,” which includes, among other activities, significant destructive malware attacks.

(5) Secondary Sanctions Targeting Certain Activities Relating to Russian Intelligence and Defense Sectors, Sanctions Evaders, and Privatizations.

The Act requires the President to impose secondary sanctions on those (including non-US persons) who he determines:

* Have knowingly engaged in a significant transaction with “a person that is part of, or operates for or on behalf of, the defense or intelligence sectors of the Government of the Russian Federation, including the Main Intelligence Agency of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation or the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation.” Secondary sanctions are to be imposed 180 days after enactment of the Act. The Act requires the President to issue guidance or regulations no later than 60 days after the date of the Act’s enactment to “specify the persons that are part of, or operate for or on behalf of, the defense and intelligence sectors of the Government of the Russian Federation.”

* Are responsible for, complicit in, or have supported serious human rights abuses in any territory forcibly occupied or otherwise controlled by the Russian government. The Act also requires sanctions on foreign persons that (i) knowingly have materially violated, attempted to violate, or conspired to violate or caused a violation of US sanctions or the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014, or (ii) “facilitates a significant transaction or transactions, including deceptive or structured transactions” for or on behalf of a person that is a target of US sanctions, or for that person’s child, spouse, parent, or sibling.

* With actual knowledge make an investment of US$10 million or more (or any combination of investments not less than US$1 million each, which in the aggregate equals or exceeds US$10 million in a 12-month period), or facilitate such an investment, if the investment “directly and significantly” contributes to the ability of the Russian government to “privatize state-owned assets in a manner that unjustly benefits” Russian government officials or “close associates” or family members of those officials. The Act does not define the terms “investment,” “unjustly benefit,” and “close associates.”

(6) Sanctions Targeting Crude Oil Projects and Corruption.

The Act limits the discretion of the President under the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 by requiring the President to impose secondary sanctions on a foreign person that knowingly makes a “significant investment” in a “special Russian crude oil project” as well as foreign financial institutions that support such investments. The Ukraine Freedom Support Act does not define the term “significant investment” and defines a “special Russian crude oil project” to be a crude oil extraction project in Russian deepwater (i.e., more than 500 feet deep), Arctic offshore locations, or shale formations. The President can waive the imposition of such secondary sanctions by invoking a national interest waiver.

* The Act also limits the President’s discretion under the Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014, requiring him to impose secondary sanctions against a Russian government official or close associate or family member involved in an act of significant corruption in Ukraine, Russia, or elsewhere.

(7) Sanctions Relating to Support for the Syrian Government.

The President is required to impose asset-blocking and travel sanctions on any person determined by the President to have knowingly exported, transferred, or otherwise provided significant financial, material, or technological support to the Syrian government in acquiring or developing advanced conventional weapons, ballistic, or cruise missile capabilities, as well as biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons and related technologies.

(8) Secondary Sanctions Described.

The so-called “secondary sanctions” described in the Act target the activities of non-US persons. These secondary sanctions can be applied to parties beyond the jurisdiction of the United States, and they effectively take the form of a denial of US benefits, as opposed to monetary penalties available under US “primary” sanctions (which apply to US persons).

* In the context of the Act, the menu of secondary sanctions from which the President can select (generally, he must select up to five) includes the following:

– Denial of export-import bank financing and assistance

– Denial of US export licensing

– Prohibition against US financial institution making loans or providing credits of more than US$10 million in any 12-month period

– Use of US government power to oppose a loan from a non-US financial institution to the sanctioned party

– Denial of US Government procurement

– Prohibition against transactions in foreign exchange that are within US jurisdiction

– Prohibition against transfers of credit or payments between financial institutions or by, through, or to any financial institution, if within US jurisdiction

– For foreign financial institutions, (i) loss of designation as a primary dealer in US Government debt instruments by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and/or (ii) revocation of right to serve as an agent of the US Government or to serve as repository for US Government funds

– Effect on the property rights of sanctioned persons for property within US jurisdiction (i.e., asset blocking similar to those on OFAC’s SDN List)

– Prohibition against US persons investing in or purchasing significant amounts of equity or debt instruments of the sanctioned persons

– Travel prohibitions directed at corporate officers, principals, or controlling shareholders or principal of, or a shareholder with a controlling interest in

– Placement of any of these secondary sanctions on the principal executive officer or similar officers of the sanctioned person

IRAN

Largely in response to Iran’s ballistic missile tests, the Act imposes new sanctions targeting Iran’s defense sector and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

(9) Asset-Freezing and Terrorism-Related Sanctions.

The Act requires the President to impose asset-freezing sanctions (and for non-US persons, a travel ban) against any US or foreign person that knowingly engages “in any activity that materially contributes to the activities of the Government of Iran with respect to its ballistic missile program” or programs to develop, deploy, or maintain weapons of mass destruction. Subject to his exercise of a national security interest waiver, the President must also impose asset-freezing sanctions (and for non-US persons, a travel ban) against any US or foreign person who knowingly contributes to the “supply, sale, or transfer” to Iran of “battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, large caliber artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems … or related materiel, including spare parts.”

* The Act also requires the President to impose the same sanctions on those who knowingly provide “technical training, financial resources or services, advice” or other services in supporting the use of the material listed. 90 days after the Act’s enactment, the President must impose terrorism-related sanctions pursuant to Executive Order 13224 against the IRGC and its “officials, agents or affiliates.” Notably, significant transactions with the IRGC can already subject non-US persons to US secondary sanctions, which survived the implementation of the Nuclear Agreement with Iran in January 2016.

NORTH KOREA

Largely in response to North Korea’s successful test of an intercontinental ballistic missile on July 4, 2017, the House of Representatives recently introduced certain North Korea-related provisions to the Act. Among other measures, the Act requires the US Secretary of State to provide Congress, within 90 days of enactment, a determination as to whether North Korea should be considered a state sponsor of terrorism.

(10) Additional Designation Authority and Human Rights Provisions.

The Act broadens the list of persons the President must impose asset-blocking measures under the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016 (NKSPEA). These additional targets include those who knowingly procure certain precious metals from North Korea; sell or transfer rocket, aviation or jet fuel to North Korea; provide fuel or supplies for designated North Korean vessels or aircraft; provide insurance services to vessels owned or controlled by the North Korean government; or maintain a correspondent account with any North Korean financial institution.

* The Act also expands the President’s discretionary authority to designate parties under the NKSPEA, including parties who knowingly acquire coal, iron, or iron ore from the North Korean government; purchase significant amounts of textiles from North Korea; or sell or transfer significant amounts of crude oil, condensates, petroleum products, or natural gas resources to the North Korean government, among other activities. Under the human rights-related provisions, the Act prohibits most goods produced by North Korean labor from entering the US and allows for the imposition of sanctions on most parties who knowingly employ North Korean labor.

* These new North Korea sanctions presumptively increase the prospects of designations of parties from China in the coming weeks.