Archive for the ‘Canada’ Category

US Oil & Gas Company Fined $25 Million from BIS & OFAC

Tuesday, December 20th, 2016 by Danielle McClellan


National Oilwell Varco, Inc., a Delaware corporation, and its Canadian subsidiaries, Dreco Energy Services, Ltd (Dreco) and NOV Elmar (NOV) have agreed to pay a combined $25 Million for violations of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations, the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, and the Sudanese Sanctions Regulations.

The charges are as follows:

  • Between 2002 and 2005, National Oilwell Varco approved four Dreco commission payments to a UK based entity related to the sale and exportation of goods from Dreco to Iran. The four commission payments had a combined value of $2,630,091.
  • Between 2006 and 2008 National Oilwell Varco was involved in two transactions involving the sale and exportation of goods to Iran that totaled $13,596,980.
  • Between 2003 and 2007, Dreco knowingly exported (indirectly) goods from the US to fill seven orders from Iranian customers. The transactions totaled $526,480.
  • During 2007 and 2009, Dreco engaged in 45 transactions involving the sale of goods to Cuba totaling $1,707,964.
  • NOV engaged in two transactions between 2007 and 2008 involving the sale of goods or services to Cuba that totaled $103,119.
  • Finally, between 2005 and 2006 NOV engaged is a $20,928 transaction involving the exportation of goods from the US to Sudan.

OFAC considered the violations to be egregious since senior-level executives approved the commission payments and the NOV “willfully blinded” itself of the regulation violations by continuing to approve payments and communications. NOV will pay OFAC a settlement of $5,976,028, this will be deemed satisfied with its payment of $25,000,000 in relation to its settlement agreement between OFAC, BIS, and a Non-Prosecution Agreement (NPA).

OFAC considered the following to be aggravating factors:

  1. NOV’s conduct that gave rise to the Apparent Violations demonstrated at least reckless disregard for U.S. sanctions requirements;
  2. Senior managers at National Oilwell Varco, Inc. and Dreco knew or had reason to know that their respective business transactions giving rise to the ITSR-related apparent violations involved Iran;
  3. NOV’s conduct caused harm to sanctions program objectives by providing a significant and sustained economic benefit to the petroleum industries in Cuba, Iran, and Sudan;
  4. NOV is a large and sophisticated company that is engaged in the business of providing oilfield services around the world, including regions with high sanctions risk; and
  5. NOV’s compliance program at the time of the Apparent Violations was wholly inadequate.

OFAC considered the following to be mitigating factors:

  1. NOV had not received a Penalty Notice or Finding of Violation in the five years preceding the date of the earliest transaction giving rise to the Apparent Violations;
  2. NOV cooperated with OFAC’s investigation, including by agreeing to toll the statute of limitations for more than 2,600 days; and
  3. NOV has made efforts to remediate its compliance program and agreed to further compliance enhancements.

More Information:

Another Contract Bites the Dust

Thursday, November 5th, 2015 by Danielle McClellan


By: Danielle McClellan

The United States Naval Air Warfare Center (NAVAIR) Aircraft Division awarded Tactical Lighting Systems Inc. (Tactical) with a contract to develop landing lights. Tactical announced on May 19, 2015 that they planned to add Carmanah Technologies Corporation (Carmanah) of Victoria, BC as a subcontractor to the contract.

Fast forward about 6 months, after struggles with the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), Tactical and Carmanah have mutually agreed to stop working together on the project. The decision was based on significant operational challenges related to the ITAR under the contract with NAVAIR. The two companies agreed that the ITAR placed such significant barriers for the two to work together on the project that they could not jointly work together and comply with the export controls required.

More information:

CBSA Will Be Penalizing for Noncompliance of Arrival Notifications

Friday, September 11th, 2015 by Danielle McClellan


By: Danielle McClellan

On May 6, 2015 The Canada Border Service Agency (CBSA) began requiring the electronic warehouse arrival certification message to be transmitted by registered participants in the CBSA’s Release Notification System using an electronic data interchange method when unreleased commercial shipments physically arrive at the sufferance warehouse to which they are destined. It also became mandatory for air, marine and rail carriers who operate conveyances arriving in Canada from a foreign country to transmit electronic conveyance arrival certification messages to CBSA.

The CBSA has announced that from July 10, 2015 to January 10, 2016, noncompliance with the new arrival notification requirements may be met with zero-rated (non-monetary) penalties under the Administrative Monetary Penalty System (AMPS). Noncompliance after January 10, 2016 will be met with monetary AMPS penalties.

The following information provides policy requirements for CACM messages for each mode of transport:

Marine – The CACM must be transmitted electronically when the vessel lands at a CBSA office upon arrival in Canada; i.e., when it first comes to rest in Canada, whether at anchor, at dock or berthed alongside at the nearest CBSA office designated for that purpose. The CACM can be transmitted and received within a two-hour window prior to arrival, allowing carriers to transmit their arrival request up to two hours in advance of their actual arrival at a Canadian port, provided the vessel is within Canadian waters at the time the request is submitted.

Air – The CACM must be transmitted electronically without delay after the aircraft that is transporting cargo is cleared by NAV Canada to land at an airport following arrival in Canada.

Rail – The CACM must be transmitted electronically up to 30 minutes in advance of the actual arrival of the conveyance at the Canadian border.

The CBSA notes that marine and air conveyances exempt from transmitting electronic conveyance data are also exempt from transmitting CACMs. This exemption will also apply to rail conveyances for an appropriate period of time.

More Information:

CANADA: Key Developments in Economic Sanctions and Export Controls and What to Watch for in 2015

Wednesday, March 25th, 2015 by Brooke Driver


By: John Boscariol (Source:

In recent years, Canada has significantly expanded its multilateral and unilateral trade control measures. Broader scope and increased enforcement in the areas of economic sanctions, export and technology transfer controls, and defence trade controls have raised the stakes for Canadians engaged in cross-border activities. Enforcement and reputational risk is higher than ever and it is critical for any Canadian company doing business abroad to ensure it has internal controls in place to mitigate the growing risk exposure.

During 2014, developments in Russia, the Ukraine and Middle East brought into focus the sanctions risk exposure of Canadian companies regardless of where they do business. In addition, new developments in export and technology transfer controls as well as defence trade controls highlight the importance of keeping apprised of these evolving rules. The following summarizes the most significant of these developments and what they mean for trade control enforcement and compliance in 2015.

Economic Sanctions

Russia and Ukraine

Without a doubt, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was the big sanctions story of 2014. Canada has been particularly vociferous in its opposition to the Putin regime, being among the first of any country to threaten sanctions over Russian interference in the Ukraine even before the departure of former President Viktor Yanukovych.

Beginning in March and continuing throughout 2014, Canada implemented broad listed-based sanctions in response to Russian aggression towards Ukraine and the annexation of the Crimea region. Under the Special Economic Measures (Russia) Regulations (the “Russia Regulations”), persons in Canada and Canadians outside Canada are prohibited from engaging in a broad range of dealings with listed Russian individuals and entities, generally referred to as “Designated Persons” under Canadian sanctions law. The Special Economic Measures (Ukraine) Regulations applies similar restrictions in respect of listed Designated Persons in Ukraine. The Freezing Assets of Corrupt Foreign Officials (Ukraine) Regulations prohibits dealings involving listed persons associated with the former Yanukovych regime. Currently, Canada has listed more individuals and entities than either the United States or the European Union under their respective Russia/Ukraine sanctions.

Under the Russia Regulations, Canada also now prohibits providing financing for or dealing in new debt of longer than 30 or 90 days’ maturity (depending on the entity) in relation to certain listed entities, their property or any interests or rights in their property. Dealing in new securities, including shares or any other ownership interest in relation to certain listed entities, their property or any interests or rights in their property is also prohibited.

On December 19, 2014, Canada implemented restrictions on the supply of certain goods and technology to Russian oil exploration and production activities. Persons in Canada and Canadian outside Canada are now prohibited from exporting, selling, supplying or shipping any listed goods, wherever situated, to Russia or to any person in Russia for use in offshore oil exploration or production at a depth greater than 500 metres, oil exploration or production in the Arctic, or shale oil exploration or production. The new measures also prohibit the provision to Russia or to any person in Russia of any financial, technical or other services related to such prohibited goods.


Although no new measures have been imposed by Canada against Iran since a comprehensive trade embargo was put in place on May 29, 2013, Canada has made it clear that it will continue to enforce its sanctions measures aggressively even as the United States and other members of the P5 +1 seek to negotiate the cessation of Iran’s nuclear program in return for the relaxation of economic sanctions.

The investigation and conviction of Lee Specialties Ltd. (“Lee”) for violation of Canada’s Iran sanctions is an example. On April 14, 2014, Lee pled guilty to violating the Special Economic Measures (Iran) Regulations (“Iran Regulations”) by attempting to export to Iran a shipment containing 50 Viton O-rings worth approximately 30 cents apiece. These items are listed as prohibited goods under Schedule 2 of the Iran Regulations. According to the Agreed Statement of Facts, Lee’s customer had locations in Dubai and Iran. Although there was some confusion with respect to the shipping address, the shipment eventually went out addressed to the customer’s Tehran location. The shipment was seized by the Canada Border Services Agency and, as a result of a plea, Lee was convicted and fined $90,000.


The December 17, 2014 announcement by the Obama administration that it would be seeking normalization of US relations with Cuba and the spectre of potential relaxations in the trade embargo has reignited interest in Cuban business opportunities. Although a complete repeal of the US embargo does not appear to be the cards at this time, the pursuit of Cuba-related business brings in to focus longstanding conflicts between Canadian and US law in this area.

An order issued under Canada’s Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act make it a criminal offence for companies in Canada and their officers, directors and employees in a position of authority to comply with the US trade embargo of Cuba – this includes Canadian companies that are owned or controlled from the United States and are therefore prohibited from doing business with Cuba under the Cuban Assets Control Regulations. Further, the FEMA order requires immediate written notification to the Attorney General of Canada of any communication relating to the US trade embargo. Companies dealing with Cuban trade or investment opportunities should be treading carefully to mitigate risk on both sides of the border.

Other Countries

During 2014, Canada also imposed new economic sanctions measures under its Special Economic Measures Act against South Sudan and under its United Nations Act against Yemen and the Central African Republic. These are all list-based measures targeting identified Designated Persons. Canada also intensified its existing sanctions measures against Syria by prohibiting various activities relating to chemicals that can be used as precursors to chemical weapons agents and dual-use equipment that can be used in a chemical weapons program.

What to Watch For in 2015

Russia, Ukraine and Iran will continue to be Canadian sanctions “hotspots”. At the present time, Canada imposes trade controls of varying degrees on activities involving 22 other countries and well over 2,000 listed entities and individuals associated with them, including Belarus, Burma (Myanmar), the Central African Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Cuba, Egypt, Eritrea, Guinea, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, North Korea, Pakistan, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Yemen and Zimbabwe. In addition to monitoring their activities as they may relate to sanctioned countries, Canadian companies need to be screening their international business partners and end-users against the lists of designated entities and individuals under Canada’s sanctions measures regardless of where they are doing business.

A lack of written and verbal guidance from the Canadian government continues to present significant challenges for those seeking to understand and comply with Canadian economic sanctions law. In his February 11, 2014 Budget, the late Finance Minister Jim Flaherty recognized significant improvements to the sanctions regime were required, including making available a consolidated list of Designated Persons. Although DFATD’s sanctions website has undergone some mostly cosmetic changes, the Canadian business community continues to wait for more substantive changes and assistance akin to what their competitors benefit from in the United States, the European Union, Australia and elsewhere.

Export and Technology Transfer Controls

Export and technology transfer controls are more narrow in scope than economic sanctions as they only apply to transfers of goods and technology from Canada to a place outside of Canada. However, they continue to present significant compliance challenges for Canadian businesses across all sectors of the economy.

Keeping Up With Changes in International Regimes

Canada made significant amendments to its controls governing the export and transfer of goods and technology twice during 2014 – on April 10 and December 5. In both instances, the changes were intended to bring Canada’s Export Control List (“ECL”) into conformity with its commitments under international export control regimes, including the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, and the Australia Group.

Notably, the most recent changes introduce new export and technology transfer controls on intrusion software and related technology and systems and IP network communication surveillance systems.

Israel and Kuwait Cleared for Firearms Exports

Canada maintains strict controls over the transfer of certain prohibited firearms, weapons, and devices and their components and parts – including, for example, fully automatic weapons, electric stun guns and large-capacity magazines. Applications for export permits for these items may be submitted only if they are for transfers to one of the 37 countries listed on the Automatic Firearms Country Control List. Effective January 14, 2015, Israel and Kuwait have been added to that list. The government is currently in consultations for adding the United Arab Emirates as well.

What to Watch for in 2015

Over the last few years, the Canadian government has been releasing new General Export Permits (“GEPs”) to facilitate the transfer of controlled items from Canada to “safe” destinations. These GEPs differ from individual export permits in that exporters may rely upon them by meeting specified conditions, including reporting and record keeping, without having to prepare and submit an export permit application. GEP 45 and GEP 46 were issued in 2012 and 2013, respectively, for certain transfers of certain encryption goods and technology to eligible destinations.

The government continues to work on GEP No. 41 which is expected to allow for the export of a broad range of dual-use items (Group 1 and item 5504 of the ECL) to countries that are members of the four multilateral export regimes noted above. We understand that the government is also preparing GEPs for goods exported for repair abroad as well as for goods exported after repair in Canada. The government has also advised that it is reviewing all existing GEPs to ensure their continued relevance.

Canadian companies should also expect further changes to the ECL to bring it in line with commitments under the four multilateral export regimes negotiated after 2013. To get a head-start on this, the websites for those regimes, including the Wassenaar Arrangement, will be a key resource.

Canadian companies engaged in cross-border activities should continue to carefully monitor compliance with these complex rules. The reputational impact of export control violations, even alleged violations, is evident from the recent reports of a $10 million plus settlement against the Canadian government related to its investigation against two Vancouver business people, Stephen and Perienne de Jaray. On April 29, 2010, the CBSA Criminal Investigations Division charged them for their failure to obtain export permits for the shipment of 5,100 dual-use electronic chips and circuit boards to Hong Kong, charges that carry with them the possibility of unlimited penalties and up to 10 years in jail. Those charges were later withdrawn but with their reputations and business destroyed, the de Jarays filed a $17 million suit against the Canadian government. In January 2015, it was reported that the claim was settled with the second largest payout of its kind in Canadian history.

Defence Trade Controls

New “Two Stream” Definition of Controlled Goods

On June 4, 2014, significant changes were made to the scope of goods and technology subject to the Controlled Goods Program (“CGP”), Canada’s domestic security regime for listed defence, satellite, space and aerospace goods and technology.

The Schedule to the Defence Production Act was amended to create two streams of goods and technology subject to the rigorous security and screening controls of the CGP. This regime now applies to the possession, examination, and transfer in Canada of:

  1. all US-origin goods and technology that are “defense articles” as defined under section 120.6 of the US International Traffic in Arms Regulations (“ITAR”) and all non-US-origin items that are manufactured using US-origin “technical data”, as defined in US ITAR section 120.10 if the “technical data” is a “defense article”, and
  2. certain goods and technology, regardless of origin, listed in Groups 2 (military), 5 (strategic), and 6 (missile technology) of the Export Control List.

In incorporating explicit reference to goods and technology classified under the US ITAR, these changes are intended to ensure that as the United States proceeds with export control reforms that are transferring ITAR-controlled items to dual-use Department of Commerce controls, the coverage of the CGP remains in step with US defence trade controls under the ITAR. The second stream covers items, regardless of their origin, considered by Canada to have strategic significance or pose national security concerns.

New Non-Disclosure Statement

Canada is still experiencing growing pains with the interaction between the CGP and US ITAR section 126.18 – “Exemptions regarding intra-company, intra-organization, and intra-governmental transfers to employees who are dual nationals or third-country nationals”. Section 126.18 provides that, under certain conditions, approval of the US Department of Defense Trade Controls (“DDTC”) is not required for the transfer of ITAR defence articles to foreign business entities that are approved end-users, including the transfer to bona fide regular employees who are dual or third-country nationals.

Those conditions include implementation of an employee screening process by the recipient of such ITAR defence articles. Security enhancements made to the CGP in 2011 were specifically intended to ensure that Canadian CGP-registered companies would also meet the requirements of ITAR section 126.18 and thereby alleviate the human rights concerns that had historically plagued those Canadian employers seeking to comply with ITAR restrictions based on nationality and country of birth. However, there has been significant uncertainty over whether CGP registrants are also required to have their employees sign the separate non-disclosure agreement (“NDA”) required by section 126.18(c)(2) in addition to employee screening. DDTC has published a suggested NDA form, however, it specifically refers to compliance with US laws, including ITAR, and dealings with US embargoed countries, including Cuba.

To address this uncertainty, in October of 2014 Public Works and Government Services Canada’s Controlled Goods Directorate (“CGD”) issued a new “Notice of Security Assessment, Authorization and Acknowledgment Relating to Controlled Goods” that is required to be signed by all directors, officer, employees and students screened under the CGP. Although it makes no reference to the ITAR or compliance with US laws, it includes a statement that the signatory agrees not to disclose or transfer a controlled good to another person, company or individual, or permit the examination of a controlled good by a person, company or individual who is not registered or exempt from registration with the CGP. The CGD has stated that “this acknowledgement may be used to meet the requirements of ITAR 126.18(c)(2),” however there has been no such confirmation from DDTC.

What to Expect for 2015

Adjusting to the new two-stream definition of controlled goods, which distinguishes between US-origin and “any-origin” goods and technology, may present challenges for CGP-registrants attempting to track the origin of these items within their inventory and other systems. Those companies may find it easier to treat all items identified in both streams as controlled goods regardless of their origin. Also, issues with the relationship between the US ITAR and Canadian CGP will likely continue through 2015.

There are also new CGP initiatives that are expected to be implemented in the coming year. Whether the 2011 security enhancements are permitted under the Controlled Goods Regulations has been an issue of controversy for some time. CGD has indicated that amendments will be made to these regulations this year for purposes of clarification. Further, following rounds of consultations in 2013 and 2014, CGD is expected to implement a service fee regime for CGP-registrants in 2015 or 2016. Annual fees are expected to be $690 for sole proprietorships (businesses with one employee), $920 for businesses with up to 99 employees and $2,230 for businesses with 100 or more employees.


2015 promises to be as busy, if not busier, than 2014 in the area of economic sanctions, export controls and defence trade controls. Although the risks and consequences of non-compliance are higher than ever, those companies that take the time and effort to develop and implement efficient and effective compliance programs will enjoy a substantial advantage over their competitors by avoiding the significant costs of enforcement action, including monetary penalties, border delays, and reputational damage.

Canada Expands Sanctions against Russia to Target Russian Oil Industry

Wednesday, February 4th, 2015 by Brooke Driver


By: Brooke Driver

In solidarity with U.S. and EU energy sector restrictions placed on Russia, Canada announced this December its decision to impose restrictions on the export of certain goods and services related to Artic shale oil exploration or production. The December order reflects the August 6, 2014 Harper government announcement that it would impose export restrictions on technologies used in Russian oil exploration activities. Specifically, the sanction prohibits entities located in Canada or Canadian entities located outside the country from exporting or supplying any listed goods that to a Russian entity that would be used in offshore oil exploration or production at a depth greater than 500 meters, in oil exploration or production in the Arctic or in shale oil exploration or production. Canada has also added 20 Russian and Ukrainian individuals to its lists of designated persons.

Chinese Man Attempts to Smuggle 51 Turtles in His Pants across the Canadian Border

Monday, November 24th, 2014 by Brooke Driver


By: Brooke Driver

Now here’s one you don’t hear every day, folks. Recently, Kai Xu, a Chinese-born Canadian citizen and engineering student at the University of Waterloo, attempted—unsuccessfully, of course—to smuggle 51 turtles of various species across the Detroit-Windsor border into Canada…in his pants.

And while the incident sounds more like a Road Runner episode than an export enforcement case, turtle smuggling is apparently a more common problem than you’d think, with a high demand for turtles as food or pets and one species—which was represented in the unfortunate hostages in Xu’s sweatpants—worth as much as $800 a pop.

And apparently, this is not the first time Xu has attempted to smuggle these animals (although, for his sake, we hope this was the first time the turtles were strapped to his legs and groin—ouch!). This is one in a series of incidents involving the 26-year-old Xu, who was also recently arrested, along with accomplice Lihua Lin, for attempting to fly to Shanghai with over 200 turtles hidden in Lin’s suitcase.

And while the crime is rather funny, the potential consequences aren’t. Xu, charged with smuggling, illegal trading and exporting could serve up to ten years behind bars for his crimes.

The (assuredly traumatized) turtles in question have been seized and placed with Fish and Wildlife Service agents, where they will hopefully lead a peaceful and pants-free life from now on.

Bass Pro Fined for Illegal Rifle Scope Exports

Wednesday, July 16th, 2014 by Brooke Driver


By: John Black

What? Bass Pro Shops, the favorite store for all my redneck buddies and family members got busted for sending scopes to the Chinese Communists? What in the world can be next?

BIS announced on the 10th of June that it has settled with the outdoors retail giant Bass Pro over its nine alleged violations of the Export Administration Regulations. According to BIS, during the period between June 2, 2010 and June 29, 2011, Bass Pro exported controlled optical sighting devices with a total value of $3,513 to end users in Canada, China and Cyprus without first attaining the necessary licensure. These items are controlled for Firearms Conventions reasons when exporting to Canada and Crime Control reasons when exporting to the two other countries.

Although the total amount of the shipments was fairly low, BIS has decided to enforce a $25,000 penalty, likely due to the number of countries involved in the illegal transactions.

Top 5 Things Canadian Firms Need to Know About US Export Control Reform

Friday, May 23rd, 2014 by Brooke Driver


By: Scott Gearity

1. Reform makes exporting transitioned items from the US to Canada especially simple 

A key feature – perhaps the key feature – of Export Control Reform is that many items which were once controlled (or assumed to be controlled) under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations have or will instead come under the scope of the Export Administration Regulations.

One of the major differences between the ITAR and the EAR is in how these two bodies of regulations determine export license requirements. With the ITAR, each export of a defense article requires a license, unless the transaction specifically qualifies for an exemption. By contrast, the most common EAR export authorization is No License Required. The vast majority of EAR-controlled items may already be exported from the US to Canada NLR. With reform, this treatment is extended to include the military items no longer included on the US Munitions List and now classified in 600 series Export Control Classification Numbers. In other words, many military commodities which used to require Department of State licenses for export from the US to Canada (or perhaps qualified for the ITAR’s Canadian exemption) may now be exported for ultimate end-use in Canada without a license.

This is a big change that makes exporting some military items from the US to Canada much easier. But it is also consistent with the longstanding US policy of granting Canada favorable treatment under the EAR. Canada is the only country to which 600 series items in general may be shipped NLR.

2. Reform also means easier movement of transitioned items within Canada

Want to send ITAR-controlled goods across Toronto for heat treatment? Or to Vancouver for testing? What about selling surplus to potential buyers elsewhere in Canada? The State Department may view such actions as retransfers, requiring their approval.

But just as the export of USML to Commerce Control list transitioned items is eased by reform, so is the movement of these items within Canada. In general, as long as a Canadian firm avoids transferring an EAR-controlled item for a problematic end-use or end-user or with knowledge that the other party will reexport the item contrary to the EAR (e.g. to Europe without a license or qualifying license exception), it is possible to retransfer most EAR-controlled goods (including 600 series items) without specific US Government authorization.

3. You might be able to say goodbye to the “see-through rule” 

From the perspective of the Canadian purchaser of US-origin parts and components, another major benefit of ECR is the EAR’s more reasonable approach to determining which Canadian-made products are subject to US reexport controls as a result of their integrated US-origin content. Under the ITAR’s infamous “see-through rule,” burdensome State Department regulations may apply to a Canadian-origin product – any Canadian-origin product (including entirely commercial ones) – based on the incorporation of even a single, minor ITAR-controlled part.

The EAR takes a different approach. The general rule is that reexports of products made in Canada are subject to the EAR only if they incorporate more than a certain proportion of US-origin controlled content (25 percent for most countries or 10 percent for Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Sudan and Syria). For Canadian equipment, software or technology with US-origin 600 series content, this general rule applies as well, with one important exception – when the destination is under US arms embargo (i.e. is included in Country Group D:5) the Canadian product is always subject to the EAR. This does not necessarily mean it requires a Department of Commerce reexport license, but it does mean that if the destination of your product incorporating 600 series content is a place like China, Venezuela or Vietnam, the EAR is relevant to the reexport transaction.

4. US exporters are now (sometimes) required to provide you with ECCNs 

It can be difficult for Canadian purchasers to reliably obtain US export control jurisdiction and classification information from their US suppliers. Those same Canadian companies are sometimes surprised to learn that there has been nothing in the ITAR or the EAR which generally requires US companies to provide that information.

Now, with ECR, there is, at least when it comes to 600 series items. According to EAR §758.6(b), the ECCN “must be printed on the invoice and on the bill of lading, air waybill, or other export control document that accompanies the shipment from its point of origin in the United States to the ultimate consignee or end-user abroad.”

5. Nothing is changing about the ITAR’s Canadian exemption 

Many items are transitioning from the USML to the CCL, but by no means everything. Whether the goods you purchase from the US will move off the USML depends on exactly what they are, though it is already clear that more parts, components and materials are being removed from ITAR control in some areas (e.g. ground vehicles, surface vessels) than others (missiles, explosives & energetic materials).

And what if the items of interest to you remain subject to the ITAR? The status quo applies. Some of those defense articles may be eligible for export to Canada (and retransfer within Canada) under the existing Canadian exemptions at ITAR §126.5. And aside from some minor revisions to mirror the restructuring of the USML, the Canadian exemptions remain essentially unchanged from its pre-ECR state.

A Very Busy Year for Canadian Economic Sanctions and Export Controls With More to Follow in 2014

Thursday, March 27th, 2014 by Brooke Driver


By: John Boscariol

Canadian export controls specialist John Boscariol of McCarthy Tétrault–to speak at ECTI’s US Export Controls for Non-US Companies seminar series in Montreal this May–analyzes the current state of Canadian economic sanctions and trade controls. 

As we start the New Year, it is an opportune time for Canadian companies engaged in international or cross-border activities to review the key changes to Canada’s economic sanctions, anti-terrorism and trade and technology controls during 2013 to ensure compliance programs, including due diligence and screening processes, are fully up-to-date and risks of contravention and enforcement action are minimized. This is particularly important in light of the substantial financial and reputational costs of violating these laws.

For Canada, 2013 was another very active year as trade and technology control measures were liberalized in some areas while significantly tightened in others. The most important developments of this past year and some thoughts on what to expect for 2014 are discussed below.

Further Liberalization of Encryption Controls

In its continuing effort to level the playing field for Canadian companies subject to export and technology transfer controls over information security goods and technology, on January 14, 2013 the Canadian government issued a General Export Permit – GEP No. 46 (Cryptography for Use by Certain Consignees) – which allows for the transfer of finished products containing controlled cryptography to affiliates without having to apply for an individual export permit.

Under this GEP, transfers may be made to a consignee in another country that is (i) controlled by a resident of Canada or (ii) is controlled by an entity that has its head office in one of 29 designated countries and controls the resident of Canada who is making the transfer. The exporter must notify Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada’s Export Controls Division (ECD) prior to the first transfer in each calendar year and then report on transfers made during the previous calendar year by January 31. Transferors must respond to ECD information requests within 15 days. In the case of physical exports, “GEP-46” must be specified on the export report filed with the Canada Border Services Agency.

Update of Export Control List

On February 13, 2013, the Canadian government announced a number changes to Canada’s Export Control List (ECL), which sets out the goods, services and technology subject to export and technology transfer controls that include permit and reporting requirements. Many additions and removals of controls, as well as clarifications to existing controls, were made in order to reflect Canada’s obligations and commitments under international control regimes – in this case, the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Australia Group. The amendments brought Canada up to date with its commitments under these international arrangements as of April 2011.

The changes impact goods, software and technology that are dual-use commercial items in ECL Group 1 (including encryption), military items in Group 2, missile control-related items in Group 6, as well as chemical and biological items in Group 7.

The new Guide to Canada’s Export Controls (April 2011) reflecting these changes came into effect on March 15, 2013.

Comprehensive Economic Sanctions Imposed Against Iran

Effective May 29, 2013, Canada expanded its existing economic sanctions measures against Iran under the Special Economic Measures (Iran) Regulations (Iran Regulations). Up until that time, Canada’s sanctions against Iran had been restricted to nuclear and military activities, financial services, as well as activities in certain sectors of the Iranian economy, including oil and gas, mining, telecommunications and shipping.

Key Measures

These are the most significant changes to Canada’s economic sanctions against Iran since a financial services ban was imposed on November 22, 2011. The amendments include three key measures that apply to persons in Canada and Canadian outside Canada:

(i) a prohibition against exporting, selling, supplying or shipping goods, wherever situated, to Iran, to a person in Iran, or to a person for the purposes of a business carried on in or operated from Iran;

(ii) a prohibition against importing, purchasing, acquiring, shipping or transhipping any goods that are exported, supplied or shipped from Iran, whether the goods originated in Iran or elsewhere; and

(iii) a prohibition against making an investment in an entity in Iran.

Goods that are sourced or supplied under a contract entered into before May 29, 2013 are exempted, provided that they were not already banned pursuant to the pre-existing measures and certain other conditions are satisfied. There are some other limited exceptions, including for informational materials, personal and settlers’ effects, and non-commercial packages sent by mail. Exemptions have also been added for equipment, services and software that facilitate secure and widespread communications via information technologies (provided that an export permit has been issued in respect of any export-controlled goods) and for goods used to purify water for civilian and public health purposes.

Prohibited Dealings Involving Designated Persons

There are now over 600 entities and individuals that have been designated under Canada’s Special Economic Measures (Iran) Regulations.

Companies and individuals are prohibited from engaging in a wide range of dealings with designated persons under Canada’s numerous economic sanctions programs, including its measures against Iran. Canadians are also subject to reporting requirements in respect of property owned or controlled by designated persons and related proposed or actual transactions. Financial institutions, including federally regulated banks and provincial trust and loan companies and securities dealers, are required to monitor and determine on a continuing basis whether they are in possession or control of property owned or controlled by or on behalf of a designated person under these measures.

Potential for Relaxation?

On November 23, 2013 an agreement between Iran and the P5+1 (the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, France, Russia, and China, facilitated by the European Union) was announced that provides for the halting of Iran’s nuclear program in return for the relaxation of certain sanctions measures. However, the Canadian government has been clear that it is skeptical of Iran’s commitments and that comprehensive sanctions will remain in force while it reviews the deal and Iran’s progress in implementation and granting access to its nuclear facilities.

Major Changes Coming to the Defence Production Act and Controlled Goods Program

On November 19, 2013, Public Works and Government Services Canada launched consultations on proposed amendments to the Defence Production Act (DPA) which will have a significant impact on Canadian companies in the defence, aerospace, security and satellite sectors.

Companies that are subject to the DPA and its Controlled Goods Regulations must comply with significant registration, screening and security obligations in their dealings with controlled goods and technology within Canada. The proposed amendments to the Schedule to the DPA will significantly change the scope of products and technology subject to the Controlled Goods Program (CGP), including by removing just over half of the current entries.

The Canadian CGP was designed to work hand-in-hand with the U.S. International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) regime so that, generally speaking, the kinds of goods and technology controlled for ITAR purposes would also be subject to domestic security controls in Canada under the CGP. These latest amendments have been proposed in response to complaints that CGP requirements are overly burdensome and there have been problems specifically with the intersection of the Canadian and U.S. regimes. This has included instances in which items that were no longer controlled under the U.S. ITAR regime are still being controlled under the Canadian CGP regime, a challenge that would become more difficult as the United States reforms its export controls and moves items from United States Munitions List control under the U.S. State Department to dual-use control under the U.S. Commerce Department.

It is important to note that none of the proposed changes will impact Canadian controls on the export or transfer of controlled goods or technology from Canada.

Prospects for 2014

In addition to the DPA defense trade control changes discussed above, amendments to export controls are also anticipated as Canada continues to update its Export Control List in accordance with its international obligations, including under the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies. Canadian companies engaged in cross-border transactions should be closely monitoring developments under Wassenaar and other international control regimes to anticipate coming changes to Canadian law in this area – this includes new controls over goods and technology associated with internet and network surveillance.

Further, all indications are that Canada will continue to implement an aggressive economic sanctions and anti-terrorism regime, not simply based on multilateral initiatives through the United Nations Security Council, but also through unilateral measures where Canada is of the view that UN measures are insufficient or non-existent. This continues to be the case for Canada’s measures controlling dealings with a number of countries, including Iran, Syria, Belarus, Burma (Myanmar), Zimbabwe and North Korea.

Canadian companies and financial institutions should be carefully reviewing their compliance policies and screening lists in light of these latest developments. Because of the substantial financial and reputational impact that contraventions in this area can have, it is important that any company doing business internationally, whether in the goods, services or technology sector, ensure appropriate compliance and due diligence measures are in place. These include: maintaining compliance manuals; appointing responsible compliance officers; screening customers, end-users and suppliers; providing training programs; conducting internal audits; establishing disclosure procedures; and reviewing contracts and other legal documentation on a regular basis.

At the present time, Canada imposes trade controls of varying degrees on activities involving the following countries (and in many cases, listed entities and individuals associated with them): Belarus, Burma (Myanmar), Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Cuba, Egypt, Eritrea, Guinea, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, North Korea, Pakistan, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia and Zimbabwe. Any involvement of these countries or any “designated person” in proposed transactions or other activities should raise a red flag for further investigation to ensure compliance with export and technology transfer controls and economic sanctions.

John W. Boscariol is a partner at McCarthy Tétrault LLP and leader of the firm’s International Trade & Investment Law Group. He specializes in compliance and enforcement matters related to anti-corruption laws and policies, economic sanctions and export controls and other laws governing the cross-border trade in goods, services and technology and foreign investment.

State/DDTC Posts New Agreement Guidelines for US-Canada Exchange of Notes re ITAR 126.18 Dual/3rds Exemption

Monday, March 5th, 2012 by Holly Thorne


By: Holly Thorne

Licensing: New agreement guidelines pursuant to the US-Canadian Exchange of Notes regarding ITAR section 126.18, Canada has provided appropriate implementation guidance which can be found at the following links:

I. Background — Classification Requests Section 748.3(a) of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) sets forth a procedure for how the public may seek and receive determinations regarding where or if items “subject to the EAR”1 are classified on the EAR’s Commerce Control List (CCL). In essence, if one makes a request in accordance with EAR sections 748.1 and 748.3(b), the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) will issue a formal classification determination regarding which, if any, ECCN controls the item described in the request.

Classification determinations are only as good as the quality, clarity, and the accuracy of the information provided in the classification request. The rules pertaining to the classification of composite-related information are complex largely because composite related technology is complex. Small changes in facts can result in significant differences in the control status of technologies. Thus, if a classification request for composite-related information does not describe carefully and address all the potentially applicable regulatory, definitional, and technical issues associated with a particular item at issue (as opposed to broad categories of items), then the classification determination will not likely be as reliable or useful as it should or could be. The most common questions BIS personnel have received in recent years regarding such items pertain to whether information used in the production or development of carbon fiber organic matrix material systems and related structures are within the scope of Export Control Classification Number (“ECCN”) 1E001.

To read fully article see<>

The following are paragraphs 1 and 2 of the 14-page document:

Guidance for Preparing Commodity Classification (“CCATS”) Requests for Information Pertaining to the Development or Production of Carbon Fiber Organic Matrix Composite Items (October 25, 2011)

I. Background — Classification Requests

Section 748.3(a) of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) sets forth a procedure for how the public may seek and receive determinations regarding where or if items “subject to the EAR”1 are classified on the EAR’s Commerce Control List (CCL). In essence, if one makes a request in accordance with EAR sections 748.1 and 748.3(b), the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) will issue a formal classification determination regarding which, if any, ECCN controls the item described in the request.

Classification determinations are only as good as the quality, clarity, and the accuracy of the information provided in the classification request. The rules pertaining to the classification of composite-related information are complex largely because composite-related technology is complex. Small changes in facts can result in significant differences in the control status of technologies. Thus, if a classification request for composite-related information does not describe carefully and address all the potentially applicable regulatory, definitional, and technical issues associated with a particular item at issue (as opposed to broad categories of items), then the classification determination will not likely be as reliable or useful as it should or could be. The most common questions BIS personnel have received in recent years regarding such items pertain to whether information used in the production or development of carbon fiber organic matrix material systems and related structures are within the scope of Export Control Classification Number (“ECCN”) 1E001.

II. Purpose of this Document

In light of the foregoing, BIS hopes to begin building a public collection of carbon fiber organic matrix composite-related classification determinations that will be the foundation for the development of better and common understandings between and within industry and government regarding the proper classifications of a wide variety of such technologies. For such a collection to be useful, however, the requests should address all the relevant definitional and control variables in the EAR for such composite-related technologies. To assist those preparing such requests, BIS has assembled this guidance document. Section III below contains a description of the various EAR provisions relevant to analyzing the classification status of carbon fiber organic matrix technologies. Drawing upon these descriptions, section IV contains BIS’s recommendations for issues to consider and address when drafting classification requests for carbon fiber organic matrix technologies.

The guidance in this document is limited in scope to descriptions of composite-related EAR provisions in effect at the time of its publication and related suggestions pertaining to the preparation of classification requests. Exporters are reminded that they will need to refer to all relevant EAR provisions in effect at the time of any particular export to determine the export control-related obligations pertaining to the export.