Archive for the ‘BIS’ Category

Reform Regulations Published Let the List Shifting Begin!

Wednesday, April 24th, 2013 by Danielle McClellan

By: John Black

As I contemplated the 82 pages (each with three columns of the smallest font size I can read) of the Commerce Department Federal Register notice, I glanced at the corresponding 20 page State Department FR notice (same 3 columns and small font) sitting on my desk. Yep, over one hundred pages of regulatory notices that will have a dramatic impact on my job, and yours, especially if you deal with the ITAR items that will be list shifted from the USML to the CCL.

Note: The advance copy of the Commerce Department notice is 355 pages long because it is printed in a one column, 12 point font, double spaced format. It came out a few days before the actual Federal Register notice. And let me tell you one thing, there is nothing that makes an export control insider happier than getting an advance copy of a new regulation, or seeing 355 pages of advance regs come pouring out of the laser printer. I know at many a bar in Washington, people were bragging because they got the advance reg 17 minutes before everybody else.

I haven’t been studying the multiple proposed regulations that have been coming out over the past few years that are the basis for the 100 pages of final rules sitting on my desk today, so I didn’t know what to expect in the new regs. But I did know what to do.

I poured me a strong pint (coffee). I grabbed my highlighter. I adjusted the binder clip holding the 80+ page Commerce notice, so that only half of it was pinching the pages and the other half was hanging over the edge-After 29 years of reading regulations, there is one thing I know, and that is how to properly apply a binder clip so not one of the precious words of the regulations are hidden in the pinch and so that each page, once devoured by this regulatory steel trap I call my brain, will fold over perfectly revealing the next fresh page of regulatory text hot off the presses (i.e., my laser printer).

Fast forward 5 hours.

I’ve read and studied the new regs. My brain is full. (For what it is worth, I found the new regulations to be well-written and, don’t tell anybody, interesting.) Now, my job is to reduce 100+ pages of regulations to an article that tells you what the new rules do, in a fashion that reveals sufficient details so you understand the rule and know what you need to research further, while at the same keeping the article to a length you can easily understand and possibly read to the end in one sitting. OK, let’s dive in.

 

Big Picture

As I have discussed in prior articles, these regulation changes prepare the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) and the Commerce Control List (CCL) to receive items the Obama Administration decided to list shift from the US Munitions List (USML) in the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). In other words, before shifting certain military aircraft parts from the USML to CCL, the Commerce Department has to revise the EAR/CCL to add some ITAR/USML style policies to apply to certain of the list shifting items. That is because the EAR will apply ITAR-like, or ITAR-lite, policies to some of the list shifted items and the EAR will apply more standard EAR policies to the other list shifted items. These regulations also shift certain military aircraft and gas turbine engine related items from the USML to the CCL. At the end of the day (or maybe at the end of the year) (or maybe in a year or so), when companies figure out the new rules, they will see less stringent US export controls for the list shifted items.

These regulations do not simplify US export control regulations. These rules make the regulations more complex. The benefit of the complexity is that the new rules significantly relax US export control regulations that apply to list-shifted items.

The people who will be most impacted by these rules are those whose items move from the relatively simple and highly restrictive ITAR, to the complex and less-restrictive EAR. On the other hand, if all you make is EAR99 truck parts, the new rules will have little impact on your current activities.

The regulations were published in the April 16, 2013 Federal Register. The regulations do not enter into force until October 15, 2013. You may not use the new regulations until October 15. That means you have some time to learn the rules and then make your action plan to get ready for October 15.

In this article, I will highlight the most important elements of the new rules.   I will try to cover what everybody needs to know. Some of the issues I discuss probably deserve an article of their own-issues such as License Exception STA, the definition of “specially designed,” the details of the new USML Category VIII and Category XIX, an analysis of what shifted from the USML to the CCL, and maybe even License Exception GOV. I will endeavor to write articles analyzing various aspects of the new rules over the coming months, and years.

This article is not a substitute for reviewing the new rules. It is intended to teach you about the new rules so you will find it easier to read and apply the new rules. It is also intended to highlight for you the key aspects of the rules that you need to understand.

 

What Shifted from the USML to the CCL?

In its Federal Register notice, DDTC published the new Category VIII (Aircraft and Related Articles) and Category XIX (Gas Turbine Engines and Associated Equipment). Category XIX controls many of the military aircraft gas turbine engines that were formerly in Category VIII, as well as other military gas turbine engines. Category VIII no longer controls engines and related items.

For the purpose of this article, I will avoid a deep and thorough analysis of Category VIII and Category XIX and what items shifted lists. I think that is best left for another day (noting that it is currently Saturday afternoon). What I want to do here is use the new Category VIII to show you the structure and approach of the new/revised USML categories, and point out some key things to notice and analyze, to make it easier for you to figure how they impact your items.

One thing you will immediately notice is that Category VIII is much longer than it used to be. This is because one objective of the reform process is to replace catch-all language (e.g., parts specifically designed or modified for military aircraft) with specific language that names (the regulations constantly use the word “enumerates” for this) specific items (e.g., tail hooks and arresting gear, wing folding systems, air-to-air refueling systems). So, for the most part, the Category VIII(h) current control on “parts, components, accessories and attachments specifically designed or modified for” military aircraft is replaced by the new paragraphs (h)(1) – (h)(26) in Category VIII. Paragraph (h) is much longer because it names (or enumerates) everything it controls, but it controls significantly fewer items because it only controls what it names (or enumerates).

(Note: Among the many benefits of being an export control nerd like me is the benefit that export regs often expand my vocabulary. The EAR antiboycott rules made “tertiary” a part of my vocabulary. I now see that the reform regs will pull “enumerates” off the English language top shelf and bring it into my standard vocabulary.

Note: Throughout this section, when I include excerpts from the regulations, I will not include certain words so that we can save space and focus on key points. You will see “…” when I do that. I also add bold face when I need to make sure you see something.

First let’s look at the controls on military aircraft. The current VIII(a) controls aircraft “specifically designed, modified or equipped” for military use, which is a catch-all control approach. The new Category VIII has paragraphs (a)(1) – (13) which enumerates (or names) the specific aircraft that are controlled. Here is an excerpt that illustrates this:

Category VIII-Aircraft and Related Articles

(a) Aircraft (see §121.3 of this subchapter) as follows:

*(1) Bombers;

*(2) Fighters, fighter bombers, and fixed-wing attack aircraft;

*(3) Turbofan- or turbojet-powered trainers used to train pilots for fighter, attack, or bomber aircraft;

*(4) Attack helicopters;

(11)Aircraft incorporating any mission system controlled under this subchapter; 

(12) Aircraft capable of being refueled in flight including hover-in-flight refueling (HIFR);

The first thing to analyze is that paragraph (a) mentions the new 121.3 definition of “aircraft.” We need to look at that because if something flies, but does not meet the definition of 121.3, then it is not an ITAR controlled “aircraft”, so it is not in Category VIII(a).

§121.3 Aircraft.

(a) In Category VIII, except as described in paragraph (b) below, “aircraft” means aircraft that:

(1) Are U.S.-origin aircraft that bear an original military designation of A, B, E, F, K, M, P, R, or S;

(2) Are foreign-origin aircraft specially designed to provide functions equivalent to those of the aircraft listed in paragraph (a)(1) of this section;

(3) Are armed….;

(4) Are strategic airlift aircraft…;

(5) Are capable of being refueled in-flight;

(6) Incorporate any “mission system” controlled under this subchapter. “Mission system” is defined as a “system” (see §121.8(g) of this subchapter) that is a defense article that performs specific military functions beyond airworthiness, such as by providing military communication, radar, active missile counter measures, target designation, surveillance, or sensor capabilities; or 

(7) Are Optionally Piloted Vehicles (OPV)…

(b)Aircraft specially designed for military applications that are not identified in paragraph (a) of this section are subject to the EAR and classified as ECCN 9A610, including any unarmed military aircraft, regardless of origin or designation, manufactured prior to 1956 and unmodified since manufacture. Modifications made to incorporate safety of flight features or other FAA or NTSB modifications such as transponders and air data recorders are considered “unmodified” for the purposes of this paragraph.

Paragraphs (a)(1) – (5) focus on identifying specific aircraft that are ITAR “aircraft” and paragraph (a)(6) is a catch-all approach that controls any aircraft that incorporate a mission system. This would control, for example, a Lear Jet that incorporates military radar. Paragraph (a)(6), while it is a catch-all, is narrower than the current Category VIII(a), which controls aircraft “designed, modified or equipped” for military use, because (a)(6) requires that the aircraft actually incorporates a “mission system” This same concept is also in Category VIII(a)(11).

The happy news is paragraph (b) which shifts certain pre-1956, unarmed military aircraft from the USML to the CCL. Well, it is happy news for collectors and antique dealers, but maybe not for the many of you who are dealing with pre-1956 aircraft and related items.

Now, let’s look at other key Category VIII(h) controls on parts, components, accessories, attachments and associated equipment and systems.

(h) Aircraft parts, components, accessories, attachments, associated equipment and systems, as follows:

(1) Parts, components, accessories, attachments, and equipment specially designed for the following U.S.-origin aircraft: the B-1B, B-2, F-15SE, F/A-18 E/F/G, F-22, F-35 and future variants thereof; or the F-117 or U.S. Government technology demonstrators. Parts, components, accessories, attachments, and equipment of the F-15SE and F/A-18 E/F/G that are common to earlier models of these aircraft, unless listed in paragraph (h) of this category, are subject to the EAR;

(2) Face gear gearboxes …

(3) Tail boom, stabilator and automatic rotor blade folding systems …;

(4) Wing folding systems and specially designed parts and components therefor;

(5) Tail hooks and arresting gear and specially designed parts and components therefor;

(6) Bomb racks, missile launchers, missile rails …

We see in (h)(1) catch all controls on any items specially designed for the sensitive US-origin aircraft. Clearly, the US Government wants to retain full ITAR controls on these items for sensitive aircraft. If we have an item that is not for a sensitive U.S.-origin aircraft in (h)(1), we look to paragraphs (h)(2) – (26) to find the item. So, if our part for a non-sensitive US-origin military aircraft is not enumerated and controlled in (h)(2) – (26), it is not controlled by Category VIII, which means it is either controlled somewhere else in the USML or it is in the CCL.

Next let’s look at VIII(i) which controls technical data and defense services.

(i) Technical data (see §120.10 of this subchapter) and defense services (see §120.9 of this subchapter) directly related to the defense articles enumerated in paragraphs (a) through (h) of this category and classified technical data directly related to items controlled in ECCN’s 9A610, 9B610, 9C610, and 9D610 and defense services using classified technical data. (See §125.4 of this subchapter for exemptions.) (MT for technical data and defense services related to articles designated as such.)

Worthy of note is that the ITAR retains control over classified technical data directly related to items that may have list shifted to the specified ECCNs and defense services using classified tech data. A related point is that the new rules revise the ITAR definition of technical data in ITAR 120.10(a)(2) to point out that the definition of ITAR tech data includes (and controls) classified tech data related to 600 series ECCNs in the CCL.

The last instructive point here is the new paragraph (x) that will be in most USML categories. Here is VIII(x):

(x) Commodities, software, and technical data subject to the EAR (see §120.42 of this

subchapter) used in or with defense articles controlled in this category.

As we will discuss later, the new rules allow you to include CCL-controlled items on DDTC applications for USML items in certain cases. When you do that for CCL aircraft parts, you identify them as VIII(x) on your DDTC application.

 

The New 600 Series ECCNs

In a fashion similar to how I discussed the USML changes, I will discuss the new ECCNs. I will not analyze what each paragraph in each new ECCN controls. That will be left for another day (preferably not another Saturday). Here I want to point out key things you need to understand as you prepare to carefully analyze each new ECCN.

Items list shifted from the USML to CCL often will land in the new 600 series ECCNs (i.e., ECCNs in which 6 is the third character), such as 9A610, for “Military Aircraft and Related Commodities.” Certain items in existing ECCNS ending in “018″ will move into 600 series ECCNs. An important aspect of the new 600 series ECCNs are the .x and .y paragraphs, such as 9A601.x and 9A610.y, respectively.

The 600 series .y paragraphs, such as 9A601.y, identify decontrolled items such as parts, components, accessories, attachments specially designed for an item in the same ECCN, or in the USML (if the USML, of course, has released control on the parts, components, accessories or attachments). The .y paragraph will name decontrolled items-for example, 9A601.y names aircraft tires, map cases and urine collection bags/pads/cups/pumps, all of which are specially designed for military aircraft. These “decontrolled” items are controlled for anti-terrorism (AT) reasons and eligible for No License Required (NLR) to all countries, except Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Sudan and Syria.

The 600 series .x paragraphs, such as 9A610.x, imposes fairly stringent export controls on parts, components, accessories and attachments that are not named in 9A610.y and are:

1) Specially designed for an item in the same ECCN or in the USML (if the USML has released controls on the parts, components, accessories or attachments); and

2) Not elsewhere specified in the USML or CCL.

 

General Order No. 5 and Dual Licensing

Supplement No. 1 to Part 736 of the EAR contains the new General Order No. 5 (“GO 5″) that addresses various transition issues. Key elements of GO 5:

  • If you have a license or approval (agreement or GC) from the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) for items that are list shifted from the USML to the CCL, you may continue to use that license or approval after the list shift occurs, even though the items are no longer ITAR-controlled (as long as the license or approval was issued prior to the list shift).
  • Between the time there is a Federal Register notice saying a list shift will occur and the effective date of that list shift, you may apply for licenses to the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) for the things that will shift to the CCL. BIS will process the applications, including inter-agency reviews in the US Government. If an application is ready for approval, prior to the effective date of the list shift, BIS will Hold Without Action (HWA) the applications until the effective date, and on the effective date, BIS will issue the license.
    • For example, military aircraft parts that the April 16 Federal Register shifted to the CCL effective October 15: You may start applying for BIS licenses today. If BIS decides to approve your application in June, it will put your application in HWA status and issue it on October 15.
  • After the effective date of a list shift, you may stop using your DDTC licenses and return your licenses to DDTC, according to 123.22 of the ITAR.
  • After the effective date of a list shift, you may terminate your Technical Assistance Agreements (TAA), Manufacturing License Agreements (MLA), and Warehouse and Distribution Agreements (WDA), according to 124.6 of the ITAR.
  • If you chose to do a voluntary disclosure for a violation that involves both EAR and ITAR violations, you should send your disclosure to both BIS and DDTC.

The new rules are friendly and flexible when it comes to licenses and approvals for items shifted from the USML to the CCL. In addition, to what GO 5 provides, you may put items shifted from the USML to the CCL on your DDTC license and agreement applications for the USML items. This means you may obtain a single license, for example, to export a USML Category VIII military aircraft and CCL 9A610 parts for that aircraft. You may use a TAA to export both ITAR technical data and EAR technical data.

The rules for this single license for CCL and USML items are in ITAR 120.5(b) and 123.1(b) and EAR 734.3(e). To be eligible to include CCL items along with USML items on an ITAR license, these three things have to be true:

  • The purchase documentation includes both USML and CCL items;
  • The CCL items are for use in or with the USML items; and
  • The application separately enumerates the CCL items in a USML (x) paragraph-for example, Category VIII(x).

(You will notice that USML categories that have undergone a list shift will include an (x) paragraph, such as VIII(x), which is the classification to be shown on the license application for EAR items.)

There are also similar provisions for mixing CCL items with USML items in Foreign Military Sales authorizations.

 

New EAR Country Groups

The new rules create new country groups in Supplement No. 1 to Part 740:

Country Group A:5: Countries eligible to receive all STA-eligible items under License Exception STA

Country Group A:6: Countries eligible to receive only certain STA-eligible items under License Exception STA

Country Group D:5: Countries subject to US arms embargoes. This country group comes from the list of countries in ITAR 126.1 because the EAR is intended to reflect ITAR policies for these countries, especially with regards to 600 series and military items.. Thus, in many cases, countries in Country Group D:5 are subject to more stringent EAR controls than those that apply to other countries.

 

New Red Flags for 600 Series Items

The EAR says you may not proceed with an activity if there is a “Red Flag” present that indicates a high risk that the transaction is related to a violation, or will result in a violation.   There are two new Red Flags for 600 series items in the List of Red Flags in Supplement No. 1 to Part 732:

13. You receive an order for ”parts” or ”components” for an end item in the ”600 series.” The requested ”parts” or ”components” may be eligible for License Exception STA, another authorization, or may not require a destination-based license requirement for the country in question. However, the requested ”parts” or ”components” would be sufficient to service one hundred of the ”600 series” end items, but you ”know” the country does not have those types of end items, or only has two of those end items.

14. The customer indicates, or the facts pertaining to the proposed export suggest, that a ”600 series” item may be reexported to a destination listed in Country Group D:5 (see Supplement No. 1 to part 740 of the EAR).

These Red Flags reflect the theme that the EAR considers some of the items shifted from the USML to the CCL to be more sensitive than many current CCL items so there are some new special rules, such as these Red Flags, for such items.

 

Controls on Foreign Made Items

The EAR imposes controls on items made outside of the United States (“foreign made items) if, in certain circumstances, they contain US content or they were produced using US technology.

EAR 734.4(a)(6) states that the standard EAR de minimis rules do not apply to foreign made items that incorporate 600 series US content when destined for a country list in Country Group D:5. This means when such foreign made items are destined to Country Group D:5, they do not benefit from the 10% and 25% de minimis thresholds that apply to most items subject to EAR jurisdiction. Importantly, however, when such foreign made items are destined for a country not in Country Group D:5, the standard EAR de minimis rules are applicable.

EAR 736.2(b)(3)(iii) imposes US controls on foreign items that were produced using 600 series US technology or software. This control is more restrictive than the standard EAR controls on foreign items produced using US technology/software. The new rule says the EAR controls 600 series foreign made items when all three of these are true:

  • They are the direct product of US 600 series technology or software;
  • They are in a 600 series ECCN; and
  • They are destined to Country Groups D:1, D:3, D:4, D:5 or E:1.

 

New Definitions

There are new definitions of these terms in Part 770 of the EAR:

  • 600 Series
  • 600 Series Major Defense Equipment
  • Component
  • Equipment
  • Facilities
  • Material
  • Military Commodity
  • Part
  • Specially Designed
  • Build to Print Technology
  • Accessories
  • Attachments
  • End Item
  • Dual Use
  • System

I will discuss “specially designed” below. You may review the others at your leisure.

 

License Exceptions

A wide range of changes were made to EAR Part 740 which contains the EAR license exceptions. In some cases, the changes limit license exception availability for 600 series items. In other cases, they change the scope of specific license exceptions, often to make the EAR license exceptions authorize at least as much as corresponding ITAR license exemptions.

740.2: Restrictions on All License Exceptions:

  • A new paragraph 740.2(a)(12) says you may not use license exceptions for 600 series items destined to, shipped from, or manufactured in Country Group D:5, except for License Exception GOV in certain cases.
  • A new paragraph 740.2(a)(13) imposes limits on using license exceptions for 600 series items by identifying the only license exceptions available for 600 series items and identifying certain restrictions applicable to those license exceptions.
  • New paragraph 740.2(a)(15) and (16) limit the use of license exceptions for “600 series Major Defense Equipment” based on the dollar value of the contract and the country, except for US Government end users under GOV.

License Exception TMP 740.9

Currently, TMP authorizes exports to a US person’s foreign affiliates in Country Group B. The new rules would remove the Country Group B limitation.

License Exception GOV 740.11

The rules make various changes to GOV. The highlights are:

  • Certain ECCNs will limit the availability of GOV for certain items in the ECCN and the limits in GOV itself for certain items have been adjusted.
  • GOV may be used to send items to US Government contractors in certain situations, subject to written authorization from the appropriate US Government agency and special export clearance requirements.
  • GOV now authorizes exports under the direction of the US Department of Defense consistent with the existing exemptions in ITAR 125.4(b)(1) and (3) and 126.6(a).

License Exception TSU

Among the various changes:

  • TSU authorizes US universities to release software source code and technology in the United States to their bona fide full time, regular foreign national employees similar to ITAR 125.4(b)(10).
  • TSU authorizes the export of copies of technology previously authorized for export, similar to ITAR 125.4(b)(4).

License Exception STA

License Exception STA in EAR 740.20 will be one of the primary export authorizations for the 600 series items. This means that many, but not all, list shifted items go from requiring an ITAR license to not requiring an EAR license (i.e., they are either eligible for a license exception or NLR).

But wait, you are an ITAR only exporter, you never do anything (other than the occasional release of brochures at trade fairs) without getting a written approval from DDTC. Are you ready for the new world of self-policing your exports? To paraphrase Jack Nicholson from A Few Good Men, “Can you handle self-policing your exports, reexports and retransfers? Can you? You have always lived in a world that requires licenses. And those licenses are issued by officials who do a thorough national security and foreign policy review of your transaction. Who is gonna do the review for you? You? Your back-up Mr. Nerdly? DDTC has a greater export control responsibility than you can possibly fathom. You weep for lost sales and curse inconsistent provisos. You have that luxury. You know nothing of transaction review, a world in which the US Government, while slow and inconsistent, prevents dangerous exports. Government review of your activities, while grotesque and incomprehensible to you, saves lives.   You don’t want to review your own exports. Because deep down, in places you don’t talk about at parties, you want DDTC on that wall. You need DDTC on that wall. Licensing officers use words like national security concerns, RWA, provisos. We use these words as the backbone to a life spent defending something. You use ‘em as a punchline at an SIA golfing event. DDTC has neither the time nor the inclination to explain itself to a man who rises and sleeps under the blanket of the very freedom it provides, then questions the manner in which DDTC provides it!”

Or, to quote Dirty Harry, “Do you feel lucky, punk?”

As is the case with all license exceptions, the use of STA is optional. I would not be surprised if some ITAR experts who are encountering controlled EAR exports for the first time choose to apply for licenses instead of using STA. If you prefer getting a license over using STA, feel free to do so-and when I say free, I also mean free in that BIS license applications do not carry the $250 per license fee that DDTC licenses have.

In general, STA will authorize exports of most 600 series items (as well as other non-600 series items) to the new Country Group A:5 and nationals of (and in) Country Group A:5. STA will continue to authorize a smaller set of items to the new Country Group A:6.   EAR 740.2 and individual ECCNs will limit and define the scope of items eligible for STA, so you should check both before using STA. Some specific points are:

  • In 740.20(b)(3) STA is for 600 series items only when the ultimate end user is the armed forces, police, paramilitary, law enforcement, customs, correctional, fire or search and rescue agency of a government of Country Group A:5 or the United States, or are for the development or production of items destined to the same types of end users in the same countries.
    • An exception to the above country limit is that STA may be used to export items to a foreign party in Country Group A:5 even if the party plans to reexport some of the items to a country not eligible under STA as long as the foreign party has a BIS reexport license and gives a copy of the license to the US exporter.
  • The Note following 740.20(c)(1) says that STA may be used for 600 series items only if the purchaser, intermediate consignees, ultimate consignees, and end-users are on a previously approved BIS or DDTC license.
  • 740.20(g) describes the process for getting BIS approval to use STA to export 600 series end items in 9A610.a STA may not be used to export end item aircraft in 9A610 unless BIS has approved the export of that aircraft under 740.20(g) of STA-See 740.20(b)(3)(iii).
  • STA may not be used to export 600 Series Major Defense Equipment in a contract valued over $25 million. -See 740.20(b)(3)(iv).
  • In 740.20(d)(2)(vi) and (vii), the STA “consignee statement” for 600 series items requires that the end-user acknowledge the end-use and consignee restrictions applicable to 600 series items and consent to US Government post-shipment verification checks.

Generally speaking, STA is a complex license exception that replaces getting an export license with establishing a paper trail of export control responsibility. I have mentioned only the highlight of some of the new things in STA. If you have never used STA, or if you have been using it in its current format, you should do a thorough analysis of the new STA before you begin using it on October 15.

600 Series Major Defense Equipment

Items shifted from the USML to 9A610.a or 9A619.a – .c are 600 Series Major Defense Equipment (MDE) if they have a non-recurring research and development cost of more than $50 million or a total production cost of more than $200 million. Thus, these items bring with them an MDE status similar to MDE in the ITAR.   EAR 743.5 says that in certain cases, BIS will notify Congress before it approves licenses for MDE depending on the dollar value and country on the license. For Country Group A:5, the threshold is $25 million and for the rest of the world, the threshold is $14 million.

Special Military End-Use Based License Requirements

The new rule adjusts the narrow military end use rules for the PRC in EAR 744.21. First, it states that you may not send any 600 series items to the PRC without a license. This has its major impact where it requires a license for military end use in China of the items in the 600 series .y paragraphs which normally are NLR eligible for most of the world. In 744.21(f), it also adjusts the definition of “military end use” for the PRC to include incorporation in or development/production/use of :

  • USML items
  • Wassenaar Arrangement Munitions List items
  • 600 series ECCNs
  • ECCNs ending with A018.

The rule also revised the definition of “military end-use” for the military end user controls on 3A991.a.1 microprocessors destined to Country Group D:1, to include incorporation in or development/production/use of :

  • USML items
  • Wassenaar Arrangement Munitions List items
  • 600 series ECCNs
  • ECCNs ending with A018.

 

Specially Designed

One objective of reform is to clarify the meaning of “specially designed” (or in ITAR terms, “specifically designed”) and revise it, so it more precisely controls the things the government thinks need to be controlled. Another objective is, as much as possible, to move away from controlling an item just because it is “specially designed” for another item and move towards controlling items by enumerating (or naming) them in a control list. We have already seen how Category VIII and ECCN 6A010, to some extent, move away from using “specially designed” as the “catch-all” basis for controlling an item and include long lists of specifically enumerated items. That makes Category VIII and 6A010 relatively lengthy. The new one-page (3 columns per page of the smallest print I can read) definition of “specially designed” also takes the long-standing EAR approach of more-words-mean-clearer-and-more-focused-regulations.

Both the EAR and the ITAR use the same approach in their new definitions of “specially designed,” although there are some differences because each is set up in the framework of its own respective area of export jurisdiction. The ITAR definition (120.41) focuses on “specially designed” as it relates to determining USML vs. CCL jurisdiction for an item. The EAR (Part 770) looks at the definition as it relates to determining the ECCN or EAR99 classification.

The US Government refers to the definition as a “catch and release” approach because it starts out by catching a lot of things but eventually releases most things with the definition, in the end, controlling only what the government wants to control. In both regs, paragraph (a) catches things into being controlled and then paragraph (b) releases things into a lesser controlled status.

Here we will look at the ITAR definition of specially designed to understand the new approach in both the EAR and ITAR. The definition below is in indented italics and my commentary is not.

§120.41 Specially designed.

(a) Except for commodities or software described in paragraph (b) of this section, a commodity or software (see §121.8(f) of this subchapter) is “specially designed” if it:

(1) As a result of development, has properties peculiarly responsible for achieving or exceeding the controlled performance levels, characteristics, or functions described in the relevant U.S. Munitions List paragraph; or

(2) Is a part …, component …, accessory …, attachment …, or software for use in or with a defense article.

We see here that (a) catches a lot of items. Now for the good news. If any item meets the requirements of any one of the paragraphs (b)(1) – (5), it is not caught by a “catch all” control:

(b) A part, component, accessory, attachment, or software is not controlled by a USML “catch-all” or technical data control paragraph if it:

(1) Is subject to the EAR pursuant to a commodity jurisdiction determination;

(2) Is, regardless of form or fit, a fastener (e.g., screws, bolts, nuts, nut plates, studs, inserts, clips, rivets, pins), washer, spacer, insulator, grommet, bushing, spring, wire, or solder;

Paragraph (b)(2) is straight-forward good news for those items.

(3) Has the same function, performance capabilities, and the same or “equivalent” form and fit as a commodity or software used in or with a commodity that:

(i) Is or was in production (i.e., not in development); and

(ii) Is not enumerated on the USML;

That means if the military part you are looking at is identical in function, form and fit to an item in production for a non-USML item, your item is not controlled as being “specially designed” for a USML item. A note after the definition makes this even more generous by saying that a commodity is “equivalent” if its form has been modified solely for fit purposes.

(4) Was or is being developed with knowledge that it is or would be for use in or with both defense articles enumerated on the USML and also commodities not on the USML; or

(5) Was or is being developed as a general purpose commodity or software, i.e., with no knowledge for use in or with a particular commodity (e.g., a F/A-18 or HMMWV) or type of commodity (e.g., an aircraft or machine tool).

Paragraphs (4) and (5) say if the item is for both USML and non-USML items, or its general purpose is that it can be for many items, it is not caught as “specially designed.” The notes following the definition say that if you use these two paragraphs as the basis for determining something is not “specially designed,” you must have documents that prove it is true. If you do not have the documents, you may not use these paragraphs as the basis for an item not being “specially designed.”

Also for paragraphs (4) and (5), the notes say that the word “knowledge” includes not just certain knowledge, but also awareness that there is high probability that something is true or will be true in the future. If somebody disregards or avoids certain available information, you have knowledge. (This is an example of the ITAR using the EAR definition of “knowledge.”)

Paragraphs (4) and (5) give a favorable definition that can release things from control, but the documentation requirements and knowledge definition mean you better be able to prove your position, and you better take into account everything that everybody in your company knows or suspects about the situation. In the current regs, there is no comprehensive definition of “specially designed”-it is just a term that the government interprets on a case-by-case basis. In the new regs, the added clarity means you can make your own decisions about “specially designed”, but you better be able to defend it.

The notes following the definition clarify various aspects of the definition by telling you what “enumerated” and “catch-all” mean, which I already explained.

As I said, the EAR and ITAR take the same approach to specially designed. You may still use the Commodity Jurisdiction determination procedure to get a DDTC ruling on whether something is ITAR controlled as “specially designed.” A new EAR 748.3(e) describes the process for getting a BIS ruling on whether something is “specially designed.”

 

BIS Applications for 600 Series Items

In the BIS license application, in Block 24 you should enter any precedent DDTC approved licenses or approvals. If the precedent meets the requirements stated in Supplement No. 1 to Part 748 Block 24, your application will be processed in a shorter time period.

 

BIS License Validity Periods EAR 750.7(g)

Most new BIS licenses will be valid for 4 years (currently 2). You may ask for a longer validity period.

 

Export Clearance/Documents and AES/EEI

The new rules have several important changes for 600 series items.

EAR 758.1(b)(3): You must do an AES filing for exports of 600 series paragraphs a. through x. items to all countries regardless of value. 600 series paragraph y. items are subject to standard EAR AES rules.

EAR 758.1(b)(4): You must do an AES filing for exports under STA.

EAR 758.6(b): You must identify the ECCN for all 600 series items on the invoice and on the bill of lading, air waybill, or other export control document that accompanies the shipment. Those are the same documents on which you must put the Destination Control Statement.

 

Conclusion

Well, that about does it. From which items shifted from the USML to the CCL, to clearing your exports out of the country, I have tried to provide an instructive summary of the first tsunami of export control reform regulations. I tried to explain what I think is a reasonable and digestible first bite of the new reg. I also gave cites in the new regs so you can dig deeper into the issues I pointed out. And digging deeper is something you need to put on your agenda. It is on my agenda. I need to learn more about the new rules and the issues they create for exporters and reexporters. Fortunately, I have until October 15 to do so.

In the meantime, we need to develop our plans for transiting our compliance programs and procedures to the new regs. We should understand enough of the concepts, even if we lack expertise on all the details, to make our plans.

As I worked through my study of the new regs and this write, I realized that I am bound to miss something in this first run. There are many nuances to these new rules that I will discover only through reading and studying them more and, ultimately, after October 15, applying them to actual transactions. In the meantime, we all need to get trained. And we need to train others in our companies.

I don’t think I can absorb more of these new regs now, but I know what to do. Pour me a strong pint (not coffee), drop my empty highlighter in the trash, and put my binder clip in the fully locked, briefcase-ready position.

John Black is a consultant with BSG Consulting with over 30 years of experience in the field of export controls.  He regularly instructs seminars and webinars for the Export Compliance Training Institute and will be speaking on the current state of the reform efforts, among other things, at upcoming seminars in Montreal, Washington DC and San Francisco.

 


Treasury Identifies Countries Requiring Cooperation With an International Boycott

Thursday, January 17th, 2013 by Danielle McClellan

By: John Black

Once again the Treasury Department has identified the countries cooperating with an international boycott that raises issues related to claiming foreign tax credits under the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), specifically section 999(a)(3) of the IRS Code of 1986. The countries are:

  • Iraq
  • Kuwait
  • Lebanon
  • Libya
  • Qatar
  • Saudi Arabia
  • Syria
  • United Arab Emirates
  • Yemen

The IRS antiboycott rules come into play in many of the same situations in which the antiboycott provisions in Part 760 of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) come into play. While the Commerce Department does not publish a list of countries for its EAR Part 760 antiboycott rules, as a practical matter the IRS list certainly represents many of the highest risk countries for EAR purposes so it is a good starting point for the focus of your EAR antiboycott compliance program. For EAR compliance purposes, US persons should also be aware that certain other Moslem countries cooperate with the Arab League boycott of Israel and present antiboycott compliance issues. These other countries include Bangladesh, Malaysia, Indonesia and Pakistan.

For the actual Federal Register notice go to http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-11-16/html/2012-27737.htm

Littlefuse, Small Value Export, Bigger Penalty (Grabe**!)

Thursday, January 17th, 2013 by Danielle McClellan

By: John Black

The Bureau of Industry & Security of the US Department of Commerce announced that Littlefuse, Inc. has agreed to pay an $180,000 penalty for illegal exports of liquid crystal polymer (ECCN 1C008.b) to the Philippines. Littlefuse voluntarily disclosed its violations for exports with a combined value $90,017.

A penalty that is twice the value of the exports may surprise some exporters because Littlefuse did a voluntary disclosure and exported to the Philippines, certainly a low risk country.

**Grabe is a Filipino word for “wow!”

Sanctions Against Iran Target Foreign Entities Owned or Controlled by U.S. Companies and Hold U.S. Companies Responsible for Their Violations

Friday, November 2nd, 2012 by Danielle McClellan

By Suzanne Reifman, Vinson & Elkins, 202-639-6577, sreifman@velaw.com

Over the past two years, the United States has continued to escalate sanctions against Iran, targeting both U.S. and non-U.S. persons and particularly those persons dealing with or supporting Iran’s energy and financial sectors. On July 1, 2010, the U.S. passed the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA). CISADA amended the existing Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (ISA) and was designed to expand restrictions on non-U.S. entities that provide goods, services, or other support meeting particular monetary thresholds to Iran’s petroleum industry. The goal of the ISA, as amended by CISADA, is essentially to force non-U.S. companies to choose between doing business with Iran and doing business with the U.S. Following the passage of CISADA, the U.S. has continued to target non-U.S. companies that provide support to Iran through a series of laws and executive orders that have broadened the scope of sanctionable conduct and isolated Iran’s financial sector.

On August 10, 2012, President Obama signed the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (TRA). The law contains many new prohibitions that affect a broad range of industries. In particular, the TRA addresses what many have described as a “loophole” in prior sanctions. Prior to the enactment of the TRA, in many instances foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies could continue to legally engage in business with Iran as long as the business did not involve the provision of U.S. origin equipment or technology or require facilitation from U.S. persons. The prior sanctions were decidedly less restrictive than U.S. sanctions targeted against Cuba, under which foreign entities owned or controlled by U.S. companies are considered “U.S. persons” and fully subject to all of the sanctions’ requirements. However, under the TRA, any entity “owned or controlled by a United States person and established or maintained outside the United States” is now subject to the range of prohibitions applicable to U.S. persons or persons located in the U.S. with respect to dealings involving Iran.

It should be noted that the definition of “own or control” in TRA is broad, and means “holding more than 50 percent equity interest by vote or value in the entity;” “holding a majority of seats on the board of directors of the entity;” or “otherwise control[ling] the actions, policies, or personnel decisions of the entity.” The TRA does not identify the circumstances in which an entity can be “otherwise control[led]” and no other guidance has been issued. As such, U.S. companies that are parties to foreign joint ventures or similar entities in which they do not hold a majority equity interest or control a majority of board seats will still need to assess their level of control in order to determine whether these foreign entities could be construed as controlled by a U.S. company and, thus, subject to the Iran sanctions that apply to U.S. persons.

The TRA provided that the President would have to implement this provision within 60 days after the law’s enactment. Accordingly, Section 4 of the October 9, 2012 EO formally satisfied this statutory requirement. The EO provides that the penalties for violations of the prohibitions may be assessed against the U.S. person that owns or controls the entity that engaged in the prohibited transaction. The EO also provides that penalties shall not apply if the U.S. person that owns or controls the entity divests or terminates its business with the entity not later than February 6, 2013. Therefore, given the short grace period allowed for divestment/termination, U.S. companies will need to promptly determine:

  • Does the U.S. company own or control foreign entities that are engaged in conduct involving Iran that would violate U.S. sanctions against Iran? Note that in cases where U.S. companies are involved in joint ventures or other arrangements, it may be difficult to immediately identify all circumstances in which they control an entity based on the broad description set forth in the TRA.
  • If the foreign entity is engaged in business involving Iran, can this business be discontinued prior to February 6, 2013? Note that there is no general license or other authorization that would enable a U.S. company to provide unauthorized facilitation during this process. For example, a U.S. company could not participate in negotiations involving a foreign subsidiary and its Iranian customer to try and mitigate any breach of contract claims that would result from the foreign subsidiary’s termination of a contract.
  • If the owned or controlled foreign entity is either unable or unwilling to discontinue its business with Iran, can the U.S. company divest or terminate its interest in the foreign entity prior to February 6, 2013? Note that unlike the more general ISA sanctions, there is no “safe harbor” provision or other exception that would be granted to a foreign entity owned or controlled by a U.S. company that continues to do business with Iran (even if the entity is in the process of winding down or reducing its business).
  • Does the U.S. company have any of its own licenses from OFAC to engage in transactions involving Iran? If so, the company needs to consider whether it will need to cover any of its foreign owned or controlled foreign entities under these licenses going forward.
  • Can the U.S. company put the appropriate policies and procedures in place at its owned or controlled foreign entities to ensure compliance on a going-forward basis?

Given these issues, compliance with the TRA, as implemented by the October 9 EO, will present a major challenge for many U.S. companies and their owned or controlled foreign entities.

http://www.velaw.com/resources/SanctionsAgainstIranTargetForeignEntitiesOwnedControlledUSCompanies.aspx

BIS Creates New Webpage for Commodity Classifications

Tuesday, September 4th, 2012 by Holly Thorne

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) has created  a webpage in which companies can give information about the ECCN classifications (or an export control point of contact from which to obtain ECCNs) of their products and technologies.    BIS is not telling that the classifications are accurate, it is just trying to facilitate the exchange of information regard ECCNs.

If you want to post your ECCN classifications (or your export control point of contact) of the new website, contact CommodityClassifications@bis.doc.gov.

In your email, provide any of the following information you would like to be posted on the BIS website:

1) Company name

2) General description of the products/services

3) Commodity classification information website address

4) Export control point of contact (may be a general telephone number or email address)

My colleague Scott Gearty, is already way ahead of BIS on this.  Some years ago Scott created a website from which you may obtain ECCN information.  Scott’s webpage likely will have more ECCN information that the BIS for the foreseeable future.   To get ECCN information go to:

www.GetECCN.com

Stella Gets Online: BIS Has New Online Licensing Status Tracking System

Tuesday, September 4th, 2012 by John Black

BIS has updated its System for Tracking Export License Applications (STELA). You may now check the status of your export / re-export license applications, classification requests and AGR notifications at https://snapr.bis.doc.gov/stela. Applicants must input their BIS assigned application control number (ACN).  Formerly, STELA was an electronic telephone based system.

UK Establishes Baseline for Compliance Procedures for ITAR Foreign National Exemption for Foreign Parties

Tuesday, January 3rd, 2012 by Holly Thorne

UK BIS/ECO Posts Exchange of Diplomatic Notes Concerning New Dual/3rd National ITAR Exemption

United States Department of State

Bureau of Political-Military Affairs

Directorate of Defense Trade Controls

Washington, DC

11 August 2011

Mr. William Mark Jesselt

Minister -Counselor (Defense Material)

British Embassy

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to discussions which have taken place between our two Governments concerning access of employees and in particular dual nationals and third country nationals to United States defense articles and technology. These discussions reflect the shared objectives of ensuring the security of defense articles, including technical data, in order to facilitate enhanced defense cooperation between our two Governments. As a result of these discussions it is the understanding of the Government of the United States of America that arrangements of mutual interest have been reached which are described below and will apply between our two Governments.

Our two Governments recognize that it is in the sovereign national security interests of both the United States and the United Kingdom to provide for protection of their own and each other’s defense articles and technical data, in furtherance of defense cooperation between our two Governments. It is understood that the Government of the United Kingdom has instituted security procedures for governmental and industrial operations concerning access to sensitive assets and information.

The Government of the United Kingdom requires a Baseline Personnel Security Standard (BPSS) for employment screening of civil servants, members of the armed forces and temporary staff, and for government contractors undertaking contracts involving sensitive information. It is understood that this screening covers nationality rules for government service where appropriate, verification regarding immigration and nationality, screening to guard against persons posing as prospective employees for commercial or personal gain, verification regarding criminal records, and screening for other factors indicating an individual’s suitability for access to sensitive government assets. It is also understood that a BPSS allows employee access to secret assets of United Kingdom origin, custody of secret assets and entry to work areas where secret assets are stored.

In acknowledgement of the aforementioned mutual interests and security procedures, the Government of the United States of America hereby recognizes that HMG’s BPSS, constitutes a screening process meeting the screening requirements of the International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR), section 126.18(c)(2).

The two Governments further recognize that, in the course of investigations involving diversions of defense articles, including technical data, it may become necessary to exchange information concerning industrial security programs and individual data that may be considered private. It is understood that existing protocols and agreements between our two Governments provide for the sharing of such programs and data for the purposes of law enforcement under specified conditions, which include a requirement to protect such information within Government channels and to prevent it from public release. The two Governments intend accordingly to adhere to applicable, agreed procedures when requesting, receiving, and exchanging such information.

Additionally, it is noted that certain defense articles, including technical data, may be classified, in addition to being export controlled by the ITAR. In such cases, it is understood that employees possessing appropriate security clearances issued by the United Kingdom Government may be given access to United States’ classified defense articles, including technical data, consistent with and in accordance with the General Security Agreement of April 14, 1961, between the United Kingdom and the United States of America, as amended.

If the arrangements set out above are acceptable to the Government of the United Kingdom, I have the honor to propose that this Note and your reply to that effect, which instruments are not intended to be binding under international law, will place on record the understanding of our two Governments in this matter which will come into operation on the date of your reply.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.

 

For the Secretary of State:

s/

Beth M. McCormick

British Defense Staff — United States

British Embassy

3100 Massachusetts Ave, NW

Washington, DC

11 August 2011

 

Deputy Assistant Secretary McCormick

Bureau of Political-Military Affairs

US Department of State

Washington DC

Dear Deputy Assistant Secretary McCormick,

EXCHANGE OF NOTES BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE DIRECTORATE OF DEFENSE TRADE CONTROLS

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your Note dated 11th August 2011 concerning the access of employees and in particular dual national and third country nationals to Unites States ITAR controlled defence articles and technology and to confirm that the arrangement set out in your Note are acceptable to the Government of the United Kingdom that these instruments are not intended to be binding under international law.

I furthermore confirm that the arrangements set out in your Note will place on record the understanding of our two Governments in this matter which will come into operation on today’s date.  I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to you the assurances of my highest consideration.

Yours sincerely,

s/

Will Jessett CBE

Minister (Defense Materiel)

UK BIS/ECO Posts Q&A Matrix on Implementation of New Dual/3rd National ITAR Exemption

Tuesday, January 3rd, 2012 by Holly Thorne

Introduction

1.            This Table sets out a number of questions put to and answered by the US Department of State (DoS) (Director of Policy, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls) by HM Government (HMG) and UK industry, concerning this rule change which alters the way in which access by Dual and Third Country Nationals (DTCN) employees of importing (non-US) entities to ITAR-controlled material is controlled.  The effective date of the rule was 15th August 2011.

2.            This UK-specific Questions and Answers Matrix has been agreed by DoS to help UK End Users and Consignees comply with the rule change requirements and complements the Technology Security Plan (TSP) that HMG has also agreed with DoS.  The information suggested in this document is for guidance only and made without any endorsement, representation or warranty.  It is not intended to provide legal or professional advice, and any party seeking to rely on it should ensure that it has obtained its own legal advice to ensure that it is applied in accordance with UK law.

 

Clarification Question

 

DoS Clarification

1.  Is ITAR 124.16 still available for use as an alternative to ITAR 126.18 in TAA and MLA?

 

Yes ITAR 124.16 is still available.
2.  Does the new rule change offer two genuine alternatives to compliance by foreign consignees/end users; as employers they either obtain formal Government security clearance for their affected employees, or subject them to bespoke screening?

 

There are two genuine alternatives, ITAR 126.18(c)(1) and ITAR 124.18 (c)(2).  The screening procedures and associated requirement only apply to the second, and not the first which is solely concerned with security clearance of employees.
3.  What level of a formal Government Security clearance will suffice to meet the requirements of ITAR 126.18(c)(1)?

 

Any security clearance approved by the host Government of the end user/consignee is sufficient to meet these requirements. In the UK, Security Check (SC) clearance meets these requirements.
4.  Does the new rule apply to the export of UNCLASSIFIED ITAR-controlled material only? What then is the position in relation to the export of classified material? The ITAR 126.18 exemption is only available for UNCLASSIFIED US ITAR-controlled exports (below US CONFIDENTIAL). The US-UK Exchange of Notes (EoN) makes it clear that classified exports are to be dealt with separately under the UK-US General Security Agreement
5.  Does the new rule extend to all ITAR-controlled exports, or only to those governed by TAAs and MLAs? The new rule applies to the export of all ITAR-controlled material and hence all forms of US arms export licence.  DoS has recently published guidance on how to implement the new rule for licenses and Warehouse and Distribution Agreements.

 

6.  Why does the scope of the new rule include technical data but exclude “defense services”, even though both are encompassed by TAA/MLA?

 

“Defense services” cannot be retransferred as such.  “Defense services” do however remain a feature of retained ITAR 124.16 (amended) for MLA/TAA.
7.  How does the new rule treat sub-licensees and how do sub-licensing provisions work in relation to hardware licensing?

 

The new rule applies equally to sub-licensees as it does to licensees.  It has no bearing on formal applications for re-transfer. For hardware licensing see 5 above.
8.  Does conflict exist between ITAR 126.18 and ITAR 126.1(a), if so how will this be dealt with?

 

No conflict exists, because of the insertion of the phrase “notwithstanding any other provision of this part” into ITAR 126.18.  “Part” here means Part 126. Hence the exemption applies to 126.1(a) nationals and dual nationals who have undergone the UK’s Baseline Personnel Security Standard (BPSS).

 

9.  How does the new rule apply to end users and foreign consignees? Is there a distinction?

 

The new rule applies equally to end users and foreign consignees wherever they operate.
10.  Does the ITAR 126.18 requirement for NDAs (for employers with non-security cleared employees) apply to employers, employees or both?

 

How will this requirement work in relation to foreign governments and international organisations (NATO, EDA etc?)

Only the employer itself needs to enter into an NDA on a self-certification basis.  Individual employees need not do so.  This does not prohibit use of employee NDAs to support employer NDAs, but this is not an ITAR requirement and is a matter for the end user/consignee.

 

End users and consignees should note that the NDA required for the purpose of this rule change is not the same as the NDA referred to under existing Dept of State/DDTC Agreements Guidelines (Tab 11 refers).

 

HMG may follow the same process.

 

The NDA requirement does not apply to international organisations such as NATO and EDA.

 

11.  What form should the NDA take? A model NDA is to be found in the TSP and has been endorsed by DoS. This forms part of the agreed TSP for the UK and meets the NDA requirements for all exports.  DoS have also confirmed that the NDA process will involve self-certification without any need for delivery to DoS.
12.  Does the new rule permit transfers to employees outside of “the physical territories of the country where the end-user is located or the consignee operates”?

 

The transfer of defense articles pursuant to this section must take place completely within the physical territory of the country where the end-user is located, where the governmental entity or international organization conducts official business, or where the consignee operates, and be within the scope of an approved export license, other export authorization, or license exemption.
13.  How does the rule apply to personnel within the UK’s Armed Forces?  Are these to be treated as “bona fide, regular employees, directly employed by the….foreign government entity” (ITAR 126.18 (a) refers)? HM Armed Forces personnel are to be treated by the rule in the same way as other employees.

 

14.  Will the new rule require or imply the use of certification by end users/foreign consignees to exporters, that they have screened their affected employees for risk of diversion?

 

No certification is required. Indeed certification should not be requested by exporters.

 

15.  Does the rule require the disclosure of personnel records of employees of UK employers to DoS? DoS understands that any disclosure must be in accordance with UK law.  The EoN between the US and UK Governments recognises this and acknowledges the existence of previously agreed bilateral arrangements between the two Governments.  Any disclosure requests by DoS or its agents will be made via HMG.
16.  ITAR 126.1 cross-reference – Is it accepted that employees can travel for business, family and personal reasons? Yes.
17.  What about current employees who don’t have Baseline Personnel Security Standard (BPSS) clearance? Those affected employees already handling ITAR controlled materiel should already be covered under existing licences.  Other employees will be covered when the consignee has a BPSS process in place.
18.  Under ITAR 127.1(b), compliance obligations fall to the licensor.  Is this still the case with ITAR 126.18? This is not specifically addressed in the final rule change, but the answer is no.  DoS guidance on their website makes it clear that licensors have no obligation to obtain written statements or certifications from foreign companies with regard to 126.18.

 

19.  What about supply chains?  How are UK primes to ensure compliance by their sub-contractors, including those across the EU? There is no requirement to flow down ITAR 126.18 requirements to suppliers (sub-licensees).  Each supplier must take responsibility for complying with ITAR 126.18 etc.  Prior DDTC consent is still required for retransfers to third country suppliers.

 

20. To what extent, if any, could S 2(3)(B) of the Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980 render any discovery type activity by US authorities inadmissible? There is no restriction on the UK Secretary of State’s powers under the 1980 Act.  The EoN makes it clear that exchange of information must adhere to applicable agreed bilateral US UK protocols. It will not therefore be necessary to invoke the PTIA.
21. Is HMG content there are no conflicts with national regulations on employment law, privacy law etc? It is for each end user/consignee to ensure that their implementation of the rule change is effected in a manner which complies with UK law.  The TSP, model NDA and this Q&A Matrix are provided as guidance to assist end users/consignees in this exercise, but in the event of specific issues end users/consignees should obtain their own legal advice.

 

22. Will Non-Disclosure Agreements (NDAs) still be required even if a company has BPSS in place?

 

Yes.  A model NDA can be found in the TSP.
23. Will there be legal conflicts if employers have to screen certain employees for substantive contacts with ITAR prohibited nations (for e.g. Syria)?

 

Dept of State has confirmed that adopting the BPSS will meet the screening requirements.  Those UK end users/consignees who decide not to adopt the BPSS will have to introduce their own screening arrangements in order to comply with the rule change.
24. Will employers have to disclose private information to the US Dept of State about employees who are deemed as ‘diversion risks’? If an end user/consignee decides not to use BPSS to meet the screening requirements of the rule change then they may follow the guidance issued by DoS on their website dated 31 August 2011.

 

25. Will employers need to refuse or remove an employee to work on a project on the basis of a risk of diversion?

 

The end user/foreign consignee must assess the risk and act reasonably and proportionately in accordance UK law.

 

26. Currently the use of 124.16 permits the exchange of defence articles with DTCN employees of the approved sub-licensees provided they are nationals of countries that are members of NATO, the European Union, Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and Switzerland, without the need to sign a personal Non-Disclosure Agreement. Where this does not apply or cannot be used 126.18 to provide a mechanism for approval for DTCNs outside of the exempt 124.16 countries. Currently this approval is satisfied using 124.8(5) which must be specifically approved within the MLA/TAA agreement. Subsequently approved individuals are obliged to sign personal NDA’s before access to defence articles is permitted. The issue with the current approach, with many European countries, is the conflict with anti-discrimination, human rights and data protection laws when requesting an employee’s place of birth or nationality.

 

The new rule provides additional flexibility which avoids the issues pertaining to the current approach. It is potentially a simpler process provided risks of diversion are accounted for. It provides a choice – end users/foreign consignees could use either approach. Whether adoption of 126.18 clearance or screening procedures in other countries is practical or consistent with their domestic law is a matter for them.
27. Section 124.8(5) will now direct DTCN approvals through 124.16 and 126.18.  Does this mean 124.8(5) can no longer be used to approve nationals from countries outside of 124.16? No. Licensing can still be used pursuant
28. Will existing agreements remain valid but require amendment to incorporate the appropriate 126.18 wording? DoS have issued updated guidance on this transitional matter through their website.

 

29. As agreements are amended for other reasons will it be mandatory for the new 124.8(5) clause to be incorporated in place of the old one?

 

Yes.
30. Can the use of 124.16 and 124.8(5) still be used to approve employees access to defence articles in new agreements or must the provision at 126.18 be used?

 

DoS have confirmed that end users/consignees have a choice.
31. Who determines if a end user/consignees screening process is robust enough to meet the rule change requirements? Will the TSP only need to be provided at the request of the Dept of State or DDTC or its agents for civil and criminal law enforcement purposes? If a company uses the standard UK TSP agreed with DoS, there is no requirement in the new rule to have an individual company’s security plan endorsed by DoS.  Guidance is provided by DoS if a company wishes to pursue or develop its own TSP. The TSP only needs to be provided for civil and criminal law enforcement purposes and DoS understands any disclosure must be in accordance with UK law.

 

32. Do the screening results need to be provided to the US agreement holder? No.

 

33. Is there any requirement for the foreign consignee to maintain records of its sub-licensee DN/TCN approvals? No.
34. What responsibility does the foreign consignee have towards its sub-licensees? None.  The sub-licensee must ensure that it is compliant with the rule change. The foreign consignee may report its sub-licensees’ compliance preferences to the UK exporter.
35. ‘Regular Employees’ as defined in new 120.39 – that is permanent direct employees plus individuals ‘in a long term contractual relationship’ with the employer.

(i) Please confirm that sublicensees and contract employees, except those meeting the above criteria are not covered?

(ii) What does “long term” mean?

 

(i) This is correct.

 

(ii)  Per 120.39, Dept of State has confirmed that a regular employee generally includes individuals working under the direction and control of the company, working full time and exclusively for the company and where the staffing agency has no role in the work the individual performs.  This excludes sub-licensees and those working under short term contracts less than a year in length.

36. Can ‘temporary staff’ be taken to be ‘contract employees’ as defined in para 3.9b of the DDTC’s Agreement Guidelines, i.e. will contract employees with a UK Government BPSS clearance be covered by the 126.18 (c) (2) exemption?

 

Probably, but HMG is awaiting final guidance from DoS.
37   The provisions of this rule apply explicitly to governments / end users. Is it the intention of government end users to comply with them?

 

Dept of State understands HM Government will follow the TSP guidance, at its discretion and in accordance with UK law.
38.   Do the four key elements of the BPSS fully meet the screening requirements of 126.18 (c) (2)? Yes – the EoN agreed between the US Government and HMG on 11 August states that the BPSS meets the screening requirements of the rule change.

UK BIS/ECO Posts ITAR Guidance for UK Entities

Tuesday, January 3rd, 2012 by Holly Thorne

(Source: http://www.bis.gov.uk/exportcontrol)

If you a UK end-user or consignee company that handles material covered by the United States’ controls specified by the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) then, you should make yourself aware of an important ITAR rule change and associated guidance information. This rule change issued by the US Department of State concerns Dual and Third Country National (DTCN) employees. The rule change came into force on 15 August 2011.

To help UK industry comply with this particular aspect of the US ITAR controls, the UK government have issued a number of guidance documents concerning the rule change including a Technology Security Plan and a Question and Answer Matrix. This guidance has been produced in consultation with industry representatives from the Export Group for Aerospace and Defence (EGAD).

The Notice to Exporters (published by the UK’s Export Control Organisation)below provides an overview of the rule change and links to guidance documents (published on the export control pages of both the Department for Business and Businesslink websites). It also includes some initial questions to understand how the rule change might impact on you and your company.

Details of ITAR rule change (76 FED REG 28174)

1.        The US Department of State (DoS) has issued a final rule amending the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (“ITAR”)[1] to include a new license exemption for transfers of defence articles[2] to Dual National or Third Country National (DTCN) employees[3] of foreign end-users. The new rule came into force on 15 August 2011 and eliminates the need to obtain prior approval from DoS for the transfers of unclassified defence articles  (including unclassified technical data) to DTCN employees of foreign business entities, foreign government entities, or international organisations that are approved end-users or consignees (including approved sub-licensees) for such defence articles.

2.        Those UK end users/consignees who handle US ITAR controlled material should be aware that the exemption is subject to satisfying certain screening and recordkeeping requirements.  In particular, in lieu of prior approval, the new ITAR Section 126.18 requires eligible companies and organisations to implement “effective procedures to prevent diversion to destinations, entities, or for purposes other than those authorised by the applicable export license or other authorisation.”

3.        To this end, the US Government and Her Majesty’s Government (HMG) have agreed an approach confirmed in a diplomatic Exchange of Notes.[4]  This means that HMG’s pre-existing Baseline Personnel Security Standard (BPSS) constitutes a screening process meeting the screening requirements of ITAR 126.18(c)(2).  Those UK end users/consignees who decide not to adopt the BPSS will have to introduce their own screening arrangements in order to comply with the rule change.  Further information can be found in the guidance documents, which can be referred to in the links at paragraph 4 (below).

Published guidance material

  1. Following a number of meetings between the Export Group for Aerospace and Defence (EGAD) and HMG officials[5] a series of guidance documents have been agreed to help UK End Users/Consignees comply with the rule change.  The guidance documents include:

These documents are published on the export control pages of the Businesslink website at:
http://www.businesslink.gov.uk/bdotg/action/layer?r.l1=1079717544&r.l2=1084228483&r.l3=1084228526&r.s=tl&topicId=1097086699

You can also download the documents from the Department for Business website at: http://www.bis.gov.uk/policies/export-control-organisation/eco-summary-guidance

5.        UK end users/consignees should also note that the Ministry of Defence intends to communicate the guidance through the Defence Contracts Bulletin and Acquisition Operating Framework in due course.

6.        The US Dept of State has been consulted on all of the UK’s guidance documents and has endorsed the approach taken.  The US Dept of State also intends to issue its own guidance to US exporters making them aware of the specific bilateral arrangements/protocols, which have been agreed between the US Government and HMG.

Initial questions about the rule change

7.     To understand how the rule change might impact on you and your company see the questions below:

Ques1: This is a ruling from the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR).  I do not manufacture or trade in arms related equipment – will this ruling affect me?

Answer: Yes it could. ITAR controls the import and export of all defence related items and services on the United States Munitions List. For more details about ITAR controls see: http://www.pmddtc.state.gov/regulations_laws/itar.html

Ques2: I employ British citizens and some US citizens – does this security procedure apply to me?

Answer: Yes if either you or your employees handling US ITAR unclassified material are dual nationals or third country nationals

Ques3: If I want to adopt BPSS screening procedures what should I do?

Answer: You should refer to the guidance contained in the Technology Security Plan referred to at paragraph 4 above.

Ques4: I already comply with UK Export Control requirements and have licenses in place.  Do I also need to comply with these ITAR requirements?

Answer:  Yes – the ITAR requirements are separate from UK export control requirements.

Link to notice and contact information: http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/biscore/eco/docs/notices-to-exporters/2011/nte201124.doc>



[1] ITAR is the set of United States government regulations that control the export and import of defence-related articles and services on the US Munitions List (USML).

[2] ‘Defense Articles’ mean items or technical data designated in Ch 121.1 of the US ITAR regulations.  This includes technical data, recorded or stored in any physical form (including electronic transfers), models and mock ups.

[3] DoS defines a Third Country National as ‘an individual holding nationality from a Country or Countries other than the Country of the foreign signatory to the agreement.  A Dual National is defined as an individual who ‘holds nationality from the Country of a foreign signatory and one or more additional foreign Countries.

[4] Exchange of Notes refers to the agreement between the US Government and Her Majesty’s Government on 11 August 2011 confirming that the UK’s BPSS meets the screening requirements of the new Rule Change.

[5] Ministry of Defence, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Dept for Business, Innovation and Skills and the UKTI Defence & Security Organisation

 

Commerce/BIS Amends EAR re: Exports and Reexports to the Principality of Liechtenstein

Tuesday, January 3rd, 2012 by Holly Thorne

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) publishes this final rule to amend certain requirements in the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) that apply to the Principality of Liechtenstein (Liechtenstein). In this final rule, BIS aligns license requirements and licensing policy under the EAR for Liechtenstein with those for Switzerland. As a result, for purposes of the EAR, Liechtenstein will be treated the same as Switzerland.

By virtue of a Customs Union Treaty with Switzerland, Liechtenstein has adopted the export controls implemented under Swiss law, including controls equivalent to those prescribed under multilateral regimes, and has authorized Switzerland to administer and enforce export controls within Liechtenstein’s territory. As a result of this arrangement, Liechtenstein and Switzerland serve as one territory for customs and export purposes. Having recently been made aware of the full scope of this arrangement and its consequences on export controls, BIS has determined that it is appropriate to codify the treatment of Liechtenstein and Switzerland as one territory for purposes of the EAR. This treatment of Liechtenstein is consistent with the effort of the United States to streamline licensing requirements where export controls prescribed by the multilateral regimes are implemented.  This rule is effective November 14, 2011.

Source: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2011-11-14/html/2011-29357.htm